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Abstract 
 
Vast amounts of financial resources and effort have - driven by ideology, 
economic reasoning, and early success stories - been spent on reforming 
infrastructure industries in developing countries. It is, therefore, important to 
examine whether evidence supports verifies the logic of reforms. This paper 
reviews the empirical evidence on electricity reform in developing 
countries. We find that country institutions and sector governance play an 
important role in success and failure of reform. Also, reforms also appear to 
have increased operating efficiency and expanded access to urban 
customers. However, they have to a lesser degree have passed on efficiency 
gains to customers, tackled distributional effects, or improved rural access. 
Moreover, some of the literature is not methodologically robust and on par 
with general development economics literature. Further, findings on some 
issues are limited and inconclusive while other important areas are yet to be 
addressed. Until we know more, implementation of reforms will be more 
based on ideology and economic theory rather than solid economic 
evidence. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s, a large number of developed, transition and developing countries 
around the world have embarked on electricity sector reform. The pace and the extent of 
the trend has been remarkable and, by the end of 1990s, the majority of OECD countries 
and over 70 developing and transition countries had taken some steps towards reforming 
their electricity sector (Bacon, 1999; Steiner, 2001). This has occurred under a broad 
paradigm shift from state ownership and centralised organisation of infrastructure 
industries to private ownership, public regulation and market-oriented structures 
(OECD, 2000). The technological progress and reform pioneered in some countries has 
encouraged others to follow suit. 
 
This trend primarily reflects dissatisfaction with the performance of traditional forms of 
organisation and a desire to improve efficiency and reduce fiscal drain in the public 
sector. Added to this is a growing questioning of the theoretical and empirical 
justification for state owned enterprise, the development of models of competition 
within network utilities and theories of incentive regulation of private natural 
monopolies (see Newbery, 1999). 
 
The model adopted for the electricity supply industry (ESI) since the Second World 
War resulted in the use of costly generation technologies, neglect of customer services 
and economic inefficiency. Combined with the interrup tion of demand growth after the 
oil crisis of the 1970s, the traditional approach to the industry resulted in excess 
capacity. In addition, the perverse incentives of cost-of-service regulation had received 
serious criticism (Averch and Johnson, 1962). However, measuring inefficiencies and 
the effect of regulation has proven to be very difficult (Joskow and Rose, 1989; Joskow 
and Noll, 1981). Later, much of the debate on problems of regulation of monopoly firms 
has been focused on the issues of information asymmetry and incentives (see e.g. 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Baron and Myerson, 1982). 
 
The argument for integration of generation and transmission systems was further 
undermined by the emergence of new technologies: combined-cycle gas turbines 
reduced the importance of economies of scale, information technology significantly 
improved remote monitoring and control of electricity flows (e.g. dynamic thermal 
circuit ratings (DTCR) and the Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS)). 
 
However, the driving forces behind electricity sector reform differ considerably 
between developed and developing countries. In developed countries the principle aim 
has been to improve the economic and financial performance of technically reliable 
systems. A conjunction of circumstances also contributed to increase the pressure for 
reform. 
 
In developing and transition countries the burden of subsidies, low service quality, non-
collection rates, high network losses and poor service coverage have meant that many 
governments are no longer willing or able to support the existing arrangements 
(Newbery, 2002a; Joskow, 1998). Macroeconomic conditions played a rather more 
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fundamental role in developing economies. For example, in Latin America the debt 
crisis of the  1980s interrupted capital flows into the region and it became increasingly 
difficult for the public sector to maintain the required financing for infrastructure 
investment. Private ownership imposes hard budget constraints, ensures that bills are 
collected and increases revenue. Governments should note that, to privatise 
successfully, regulation needs to be improved. The regulation needed to support 
privatisation should ensure that prices are set at cost-reflecting levels which should, in 
turn, solve the twin problems of financing investment and reducing fiscal drain. 
Privatisation proceeds can also be used to alleviate the fiscal crisis by amortising debt 
and restructuring public sector liabilities. 
 
International finance and development agencies were advocates of market-oriented 
reform in developing and transition economies. This background explains the appeal of 
privatisation and market-oriented reform in developing economies which, at times, 
preceded other necessary reform measures. Thus privatisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe preceded the establishment of effective regulatory institutions, and privatisation 
in many Latin American countries clearly sacrificed competitive market structure to the 
need to raise extra privatisation revenue (e.g. in Chile). 
 
While many OECD countries, transition economies and a significant number of 
developing economies have taken concrete steps towards liberalisation, reform is only 
in its early stages in the majority of developing countries. In South Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa, less than 20% of countries have taken key reform steps (Bacon, 1999). 
China and India, in particular, are both in the early stages of their electricity reform. 
 
There are differing views and a degree of theoretical ambiguity in the economic 
literature on the effectiveness of privatisation and competition in network industries on 
issues such as the relative efficiency of privately vs. publicly owned natural monopolies, 
and gains from competition vs. economies of co-ordination in vertically integrated 
systems. In practice, the benefits of each reform and restructuring must more than 
compensate for the increase in transaction costs of unbundling vertically integrate 
systems (Joskow, 2002). The pre-reform literature suggests that publicly owned and 
privately owned firms were equally efficient (see Pollitt, 1995) and that there were 
substantial vertical economies associated with electricity generation and downstream 
wires networks (e.g. Kaserman and Mayo, 1991). The legacy of this literature still 
colours the debate in spite of post-reform evidence to the contrary, most powerfully 
demonstrated in the experience of the UK, Argentina and Chile. 
 
In many countries, reforms have encountered significant difficulties and policy makers 
have found the reform path considerably more complex than anticipated (World Bank, 
2003a). This is partly because electricity markets are characterised by the need for real 
time balancing of supply and demand (due to a lack of storage) and hence are required 
to be better designed and  regulated than most other deregulated sectors. It is also clear 
that reformers underestimated the political difficulty in moving tariffs to cost-recovering 
levels, and the problems of corruption, patronage, labour opposition to reducing waste, 
poor collection and other fiscal leakage. Simpler reforms, such as encouraging 
Independent Power Producers to enter into long-term Power Purchase Agreements with 
financially fragile counterparts, stored up difficulties that were revealed by devaluation 
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and other macro shocks. Serious reform of the price setting mechanism for residential 
tariffs, combined with economically rational regulation, both central for revenue 
adequacy, were delayed or not recognised as important, or were derailed by intransigent 
price regulation. 
 
At the same time, countries interested in reform, as well as international development 
and finance organisations, have to evaluate their options and policies towards the 
electricity sector in the light of recent blackouts in leading reform-countries such as 
Italy 2003, California 2001, Auckland, New Zealand 1998, and Chile 1998-99. As 
shown by the case of California’s electricity crisis, the financial and political costs of 
flawed reforms can be unacceptably high (Newbery, 2002b; Joskow, 2001). 
 
Within this context and in the light of accumulated experience from countries around 
the world since the 1990s, the empirical literature on reform can make an important 
contribution to the debate and, more importantly, inform policy-making decisions. 
 
Organisation of the study 
In this study, we present a critical review of the empirical literature on the determinants 
and performance of electricity sector reform in developing and developed countries. 
More specifically, the aim is to establish the extent to which the literature has: (i) 
resolved the theoretical ambiguities involved in the reforms, (ii) enhanced our 
understanding of the determinants of reform, (iii) contributed to the design of better 
reform models, and (iv) measured reform performance. We outline a conceptual model 
of electricity reform for the review that is largely based on the established structure-
conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation. The study reviews the main 
research questions and hypotheses tested in the studies, assesses the methodologies and 
performance measures used, and evaluates the robustness of the findings. We then 
identify some additional hypotheses and issues that need to be addressed in order to 
improve the theoretical and empirical basis of policy debates on electricity sector reform 
in developing countries. 
 
The next section outlines a theoretical and conceptual framework for examining the 
empirical literature on electricity reform, Section 3 reviews the empirical literature on 
electricity reform and other related studies in designated subcategories, Section 4 
summarises the results and tested hypotheses in the literature, Section 5 outlines a set of 
untested research questions and hypotheses of interest, Section 6 is the conclusion and 
summarises the direction for future work. Section 7 discusses importance of empirical 
evidence for policy advice. 
 
 
2 Theoretical basis 
 
In principle, a reform should be undertaken if it will have a positive welfare economic 
impact. However, governments do not necessarily perform social cost-benefit analysis 
prior to reform and instead they tend to rely on less formal types of assessment 
(UNESCAP, 2001). 
 
Electricity  Sector  Reform  in  Developing  Countries,,   Jamasb,,  Mota,,   Newbery,,   Pollitt 
 4
One of the main policy objectives of reform in developed market economies was to 
promote efficiency. There are different theoretical arguments on why private ownership 
and market-oriented reforms might lead to greater efficiency. Pollitt (2002) classifies 
the main relevant theories as: (i) property rights theories, (ii) bureaucracy theories, (iii) 
influence theories, (iv) economic regulation theories, and (v) commitment theories. On 
balance these theories predict that reform will lead to improved economic efficiency. 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that public ownership is superior to private 
ownership only in a narrow range of circumstances. 
 
In developing countries, the main policy objective is more likely to be a rise in the rate 
of investment and a reduction in the cost to the public budget. Increases in efficiency 
that reduce costs certainly help, but if prices are not able to cover both running and 
capital costs, investment will be either curtailed or financed at the expense of increasing 
public deficits. Private ownership offers the prospect of imposing hard budget 
constraints and the need for sustainable (full) cost-reflective pricing. Seen in this light, 
successful privatisation is a test of public commitment to address these fundamental 
problems. 
 
The counter argument is that such privatisation requires the government to create 
credible regulatory institutions and to restore prices to cost-reflective levels, and if it 
were able to do that, then the sector’s problems would have been solved. Much, then, 
depends on whether public sector regulatory prudence is better sustained with private 
ownership, or whether any government sufficiently capable of successful restructuring, 
regulation and privatisation would also be able to manage a publicly owned electricity 
industry competently. 
 
Certainly, a poorly designed regulatory framework and lack of government commitment 
may negate the expected benefits of reform. Galal et al. (1994) stresses that arguments 
such as those explored by property right theories or by public choice and bureaucracy 
theories, are not applicable to all market structures. Also, De Fraja (1993) shows that, 
within the framework of principal-agent theory, public enterprise performance 
evaluation and optimal contracts can be more efficient than the profit incentive of 
private firms. In addition, Pint (1991) suggests that regulated private companies and 
public enterprises exhibit higher inefficiencies, the former in the form of excessive use 
of capital and the latter in the use of labour, than the second-best efficient solution in the 
presence of natural monopoly. Furthermore, Megginson and Netter (2001) in their 
assessment of empirical studies on the privatisation experience worldwide suggest that 
there exists strong evidence that privatisation improves operating performance. 
 
At the same time, while the perceived benefits of private ownership and competition 
have constituted a ‘pull’ factor in the adoption of reform, the widespread adoption 
cannot be entirely explained by theory- informed economic policies and ideas. Indeed, 
most of the reform measures being implemented have been known for some time and 
their recent spread can hardly be explained as a consequence of theoretical innovations 
alone. Instead the pressure to privatise has been underpinned by a combination of long 
running problems of underperformance in state owned enterprises and observation of 
the successful privatisations of leading reform countries such as the UK, Chile and 
Argentina. This has facilitated the paradigm shift in the relationship between the state 
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and infrastructure and network industries can also explain a ‘push’ element toward the 
reform trend. 
 
Schneider and Jäger (2003) identify three types of theory for the withdrawal of the state 
from infrastructure industries. They classify them into three main categories: (i) 
dynamic theories of diffusion and contagion - emphasising the inter-relationships and 
co-evolution of economies, (ii) structuralist and functionalist theories - stressing the 
inevitability of the withdrawal of the state as a consequence of structural changes in the 
economy and technological evolution, and (iii) actor-centred and institutionalist theories 
of political scope of action - opposing the notion of inevitable convergence across the 
countries and emphasising the feasibility of multiple and country-specific paths and 
models. 
 
Although the emergence of the liberalisation paradigm for infrastructure industries may 
be explained in terms of pull and push factors, its macroeconomic effects are yet to be 
established. As Chang (2003) points out, historically in all developed economies the 
state and interventionist policies played an active role. Chang also states that there is no 
theoretical reason that a more liberalised economy will achieve higher allocative 
efficiency, or that higher allocative efficiency will necessarily lead to higher economic 
growth. 
 
As discussed, the predictive power of theory is limited with regard to the outcome of the 
reform of natural monopolies (such as the network businesses of the electricity sector), 
as this is dependent on how the sector is structured and regulated. Therefore, in order to 
enhance our understanding of the reforms, it is useful to examine and compare existing 
experience and evidence on the performance and determinants of reform (see e.g. 
Jamasb, 2002; Pollitt, 1997). In particular there is much work to be done on the detail of 
best reform policy. Empirical studies, especially those of the type reviewed in 
Megginson and Netter’s survey, tend to focus on simple comparisons of pre- and post- 
reform situations using narrow measures of financial and operating performance. As 
both reform and performance are multi-dimensional, it is important to examine the 
details of how each reform impacted on variables of socio-economic. The ability to do 
this is restricted by over- identification and a shortage of degrees of freedom. This makes 
econometric analysis challenging. 
 
 
2.1 Framework for the study of electricity sector reforms  
 
Electricity sector reforms are multi-dimensional activities with interacting factors and a 
variety of impacts. The process generally involves a set of concrete steps or measures 
based on a specific model of reform. At one level, these measures involve structural and 
organisational changes to the industry, and at another level there is a requirement for 
appropriate institutional arrangements such as legislation and new agencies. 
 
In addition, sector endowments and characteristics such as size, resource mix, historical 
development, define the initial market structure and starting point and can influence the 
reform path and outcome. Market structure is then influenced by various measures, such 
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as unbundling of vertically integrated enterprises, as well as institutional factors such as 
regulatory authorities and legislation. 
 
The multi- faceted nature of electricity reform results in a variety of outcomes so 
effectiveness and impact can be measured through different performance indicators, e. 
g. operating efficiency or increased investment. There can also be linkages between 
sectoral performance and the driving forces that trigger reform. These forces can be 
internal (e.g. poor sector performance) or external (e.g. foreign debt). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual model of the main aspects of a reform and their inter-
relationships. The model is broadly along the lines of the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm of industrial organisation. The model outlines the most important issues and 
causal effects that are generally involved in the reform. It also helps to place individual 
studies reviewed in this study in the wider context of reform to facilitate identification 
of research areas and questions that have received less attention. It is noteworthy that 
each component of this sector- level model can be thought of as having a counterpart in 
a higher or country- level framework of an economy. The remainder of this section 
outlines these aspects of reform in some detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Anatomy of electricity sector reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Motivation for reform 
 
Actual reform steps, their sequence, and ultimately the reform performance, may be 
influenced by the motives (e.g. privatisation proceeds) behind the decision to reform. 
High electricity price levels may be an important driving force. Joskow (1998) points 
out that, in the US, states with the highest electricity prices were most likely to 
Sector  
endowment 
(e.g. resource 
 
Structure 
(e.g. market 
concentration)
Reform measures 
(e.g. privatisation) 
Institutions 
(e.g. regulation) 
Performance 
(e.g. private  
investment) 
Motivation for reform 
(e.g. private capital) 
Country/macro-level equivalents of the sector-level components 
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implement reform. The main differences in reform issues, in both developing and 
developed countries, are often rooted in the determinants and driving forces behind 
reform. 
 
In developing countries, the macroeconomic crisis of the 1980s created the need for a 
regime of fiscal responsibility. A combination of high levels of inflation, increasing debt 
burden and deterioration of the quality of public services, spurred political support for 
the liberalisation of infrastructure industries. Tariffs kept artificially low for anti-
inflationary purposes meant that electricity utilities’ self- financing capacity was 
increasingly eroded during the 1980s, affecting both investment and quality of service. 
Privatisation would improve not only the financial health of the sector, but would also 
increase revenue for state treasuries, so helping to reduce and restructuring public debt. 
In addition, new investment would be undertaken by the private sector. 
 
The need to ensure expansion of capacity is of special importance to less developed 
countries where there are 1.7 billion people without access to electricity (WRI, 2002), 
and social and environmental considerations need to be integrated into reform design. 
The pressure for reform from donor agencies also reinforced the move towards 
liberalisation. 
 
 
2.1.2 Elements of reform 
 
The electricity industry is a network comprising separate but connected and closely co-
ordinated, potentially competitive and natural monopoly activities. Also, historical 
development, institutional features and resources characteristics of power sectors can 
differ considerably across countries. Although there is a substantial variability in 
individual reforms, they generally involve a combination of the following key elements 
(see e.g. IADB, 2001; Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002a): 
 
· Corporatisation of state-owned utilities; 
· Enactment of an electricity reform law; 
· Unbundling of vertically- integrated utilities into corporatised generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply activities, and where necessary horizontal 
separation of these; 
· Provision of third party access to networks; 
· Regulatory reform, including adoption of incentive regulation for the natural 
monopoly network activities; 
· Establishment of an independent regulator; 
· Establishment of a competitive wholesale generation market; 
· Liberalisation of the retail supply market; 
· Privatisation of electricity assets; 
· Definition of rules concerning consumer protection, allocation of energy 
subsidies, and stranded costs. 
 
A World Bank survey on the state of energy reform in developing countries focused on 
six key steps to electricity sector reforms: (i) corporatisation or commercialisation of the 
core utility; (ii) enactment of an ‘Energy Law’; (iii) establishment of an independent 
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regulatory authority; (iv) restructuring of the core utility; (v) private investment in 
greenfield sites; and (vi) privatisation (Bacon, 1999). The survey suggests a sequence of 
key reform steps in which the most common component is corporatisation and 
commercialisation of publicly owned utility, and the least common step undertaken is 
privatisation. 
 
It should be noted that not all the above reform elements will be appropriate in all 
countries. For example, a particular issue that arises is whether smaller systems require 
vertical separation and third-party-access. Studies such as those of Bacon do not attempt 
to evaluate reform effects but they do provide potentially important information on the 
extent of reforms which facilitates testing of the empirical impact of different stages of 
reform on performance. 
 
 
2.1.3 Sector endowments 
 
Specific reform measures and some features of market structure and institutional 
framework can generally be regarded as controllable. However, these, and ultimately 
the sector performance, are also influenced by such factors as size of the system, 
available resources for generation (in particular hydroelectric resources and availability 
of domestic sources of fuel,) interconnections, and geographical factors. While the 
sector- level endowments are given, they can exert considerable influence on the 
capabilities and options of individual electricity sectors. 
 
 
2.1.4 Market structure  
 
In our conceptual model of reform, the market structure component refers to the wider 
framework within which the interaction of supply of and demand for electricity takes 
place. At the time of reform this structure is the result of the sector’s history, of resource 
endowment and of past policies. The initial structure defines the starting point of the 
reform and is a given factor. Important features of market structure are the composition 
of demand for electricity, degree of vertical integration, market concentration of 
generation capacity, production technologies and degree of market opening. 
 
Reform measures change the market structure, and this has a direct impact on the 
behaviour of the market actors and consequently on the performance of the sector. 
Structural changes take time to implement and often generate opposition from vested 
interests. It is, therefore, important that the appropriate structure is envisaged from the 
start of the reform and where this does not happen, it can take some years to sort things 
out. For example: horizontal market power in the England and Wales electricity 
generation market resulting from the initial creation of a duopoly (Newbery and Pollitt, 
1997); vertical market power arising from the joint ownership of the largest generation 
incumbent and the high voltage transmission monopoly in Chile (Basañes, Saavedra, 
and Soto, 1999). At the same time, shortcomings in the inadequate restructuring 
increases the need for future intervention and imposition of rules and regulation that can 
increase uncertainty and tend to be imperfect substitutes to proper structure and that 
increase uncertainty. 
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2.1.4 Institutional factors  
 
Institut ional factors refer to sector- level legal and regulatory framework that influence 
and support the continuity of the reform process. An electricity act or law is generally 
recognised as the starting point and prerequisite for implementation of reform. In 
addition, most market-oriented reforms involve establishing independent regulatory 
agencies to oversee the sector and to protect the rights of consumers. Effective 
regulatory practice requires clarity of the regulator’s mandate and clarity of the rules 
defining her/his relationship with other bodies, such as competition commissions and 
relevant ministries. Regulators’ power and independence is often interpreted as an 
indicator of the decision-makers’ commitment to the reform process. 
 
The main problem here is that it is very difficult to measure regulatory effectiveness as 
distinct from regulatory governance (see Domah, Pollitt and Stern, 2002). It is possible 
to develop a series of measures for the characteristics of the regulator, e. g. number of 
staff, age, pay scales, funding source and nominal independence, but these do not 
measure competence level or performance against regulatory objectives. Measures of 
regulatory effectiveness (or institutional quality) are extremely difficult to devise. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical studies of reform 
 
As noted above, the actual consequences of reform are a matter for empirical testing 
rather than theoretical debate. It is possible to point to spectacular reform failures. 
However, the main issue is whether evidence from a small number of reforming 
countries yields useful general lessons. What is needed is a comprehensive 
characterisation (including institutional, policy and market structure) of the nature of 
reform and its effects within the context of a well framed model structure. 
 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation can be adopted 
to represent the main components of the conceptual reform model outlined in Section 2 
and Figure 1, and their inter-relationships in the form of a stylised set of simultaneous 
equations in (1)-(4). Broadly, the model encompasses most types of research question 
and hypothesis associated with electricity sector reform though the lag structure may be 
more complicated than in the simple form represented here. 
 
PI(t) =  f (REFT(t), MKST(t), INST(t), END(t))    (1) 
REFT(t) =  g (PI(t-1), MKST(t), INST(t-1), END(t-1))   (2) 
 INST(t) =  h (PI(t-1), REFT(t-1), MKST(t-1), END(t-1))   (3) 
 MKST(t) =  k (PI(t-1), REFT(t-1), INST(t-1), END(t-1))   (4) 
 
where: 
PI(t) =  performance indicator in period t 
 REFT(t-1) = reform type in previous period 
 MKST(t)=  market structure in period t 
 INST(t)=  institutional factors in period t 
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 END(t) =  endowments in period t 
 
In practice, most empirical studies of electricity sector reform have addressed types of 
questions that fall under Equation (1), namely, the effects of reform steps such as 
competition, regulation, and privatisation on sector performance. Some studies have 
focused on how institutional and policy factors have influenced the extent of reform; 
using specifications such as in Equation (2). Such simple models raise issues of 
endogeneity, misspecification, and omitted variables bias.  
 
In particular, the issue of endogeneity can be raised in nearly all of empirical studies of 
electricity reform reviewed in this paper. In the context of electricity reform, it is 
conceivable that just as reform steps can affect performance of the sector, performance 
can affect reform decision. Endogeneity can be addressed by using instrumental and 
lagged variables and dynamic modelling which in turn would require better data such as 
time-series tends to require. Gutiérrez (2003) in a study of telecommunications reform 
has explicitly addressed the issue of endogeneity. In fairness to the empirical studies of 
electricity reforms and as this paper points out, the general lack of good and suitable 
data is an obstacle to the conduct of better analysis. 
 
The basic framework outlined above could be expanded to encompass more variables 
and more endogeneity. Poor specification or, indeed single equation analyses which do 
not attempt to address the issue of endogeneity, will give rise to indefensible empirical 
estimates and non-robust estimates. In analysing and undertaking empirical analysis we 
need to be aware of these difficulties and inference from empirical tests of complex 
inter-relationships. 
 
Characteristics of the electricity supply industry and the multi- faceted nature of the 
reform give rise to a diverse range of important economic, policy, and institutional-
related questions: 
? What are the elements of an effective reform (e. g. privatisation, 
competition, restructuring), their sequencing and interrelationships in 
different economic, political and institutional environments? 
? What is the appropriate design and institutional arrangement (e. g. oversight 
and regulatory authorities)? 
? Do some market designs perform better in certain countries and under some 
system characteristics than others (e.g. size and resource mix)? 
? What are the distributional implications? 
? What is the impact on quality of service? 
? What are the roles of “deep” and country-level factors such as the level of 
economic development, economic policies, and institutional? 
 
Ideally, empirical analysis of electricity reform should address as many important 
aspects as possible, including an examination of simultaneity and the reverse causal 
effects of commonly tested hypotheses. The issue of simultaneity requires multiple 
equations to be specified. This gives rise to the well known trade-off between estimating 
a reasonably well understood single equation for which data is available but which takes 
no account of simultaneity, and estimating multiple simultaneous equations which may 
be less well specified and are more likely to suffer from omitted variables bias. 
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Many studies of electricity reform suffer from a lack of detailed data and many have 
used single equations. The attempt to gain a consistent picture of reform is complicated 
by a lack of comparability between different studies that use a wide variety of data and 
methods. Many studies use constructed indices to measure characteristics such as 
liberalisation, but particular care must be taken to avoid incorporating co- linearity with 
reform outcomes, or of imposing prior judgements of reform success which bias 
econometric results. 
 
Data availability has considerable bearing on which questions may be asked, and even 
on how these can be addressed. A common difficulty is how to represent qualitative 
aspects of reform such as institutional factors or certain market structure characteristics. 
As these aspects are generally difficult to define and measure directly and objectively, a 
common approach has been to use proxies in the form of indices and categorical 
variables. In what follows we revisit and evaluate empirical studies of electricity sector 
reform in the light of the simultaneous equations model presented in this section. 
 
 
3 Empirical studies of electricity sector reform 
 
In this section we review the empirical literature on electricity sector reform. There is an 
extensive volume of literature on reforms but, in order to be useful for the purpose of 
our study, we have focused on studies that are primarily based on data analysis, or a 
logical framework or model for examining the evidence. There is an extensive literature 
that is merely opinion and discussion and so do not meet our requirement. 
 
The literature reviewed here covers different methodologies and consists of cross-
country econometric analyses of electricity reform, efficiency and productivity analyses 
of electricity companies and reform, general economic growth studies which have some 
relevance for electricity reform, and single-country case studies of electricity sector 
reform. We also add a brief review of some important case study literature from the UK 
where may be relevant for developing countries. The primary aim of this paper is to 
review and examine the extent of empirical evidence on electricity reform in developing 
countries and the level of detail in the review represents a balance between detailed 
analysis of individual papers and the need to cover all significant studies. The paper 
therefore aims to comprehensively assess the state of knowledge rather than to conduct 
a detailed review of the methodologies and technical merits of all the individual studies 
discussed here. It should be noted that many of the key papers and working papers 
subject to revision before final publication. 
 
 
3.1 Econometric studies 
 
In this subsection we discuss the empirical literature that uses econometric techniques to 
study electricity liberalisation assessment that uses econometric techniques. The 
reviewed literature can be broadly divided into two categories: the first focuses on the 
determinants of reform and the key steps taken, while the second examines the effect of 
various reform steps on performance indicators. We also review selected empirical 
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papers that do not directly address the impact of reform, but give insight into how to 
model and estimate the impact, and determinants, of reform. 
 
Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) test hypotheses on to the determinants of reform. First, 
that country policy and institutions are positively correlated with reform where reform is 
understood as a number of key steps, such as corporatisation of the core utility or 
enactment of legislation. Country- level policy and institutions are expected to be 
positively associated with reforms. This is to be expected because adequate 
macroeconomic management, policies and institutions should be conducive to more 
active reform. The country policy and institutional assessment variable is based on 20 
indicators. However the indicators are not clearly identified – economic management 
and sustainability of reform are among those mentioned - and there is the risk that some 
may be co- linear with the reform indicator. 
 
Second, that country risk is negatively correlated with reform; we would expect reform 
to occur with higher probability in countries with lower political and economic risk. 
Once again this variable is not clearly identified in the paper, though it is stated that it is 
made up of nine indices, of which political risk and economic performance account for 
25% of the weighting. In the UK, political risk was reduced and economic performance 
was improved by privatisation rather than the other way round (see Pollitt, 2000), so the 
direction of causality is not always clear. These hypotheses are tested for a sample of 
115 developing countries for 1998. Although formulated to address reforms in the 
electricity sector, they could refer to liberalising reforms in general, as both policy/ 
institutions and risk variables refer to overall management of the economy and of the 
public sector.1 Therefore, it is implicit in the analysis that the relevant necessary 
conditions cannot be influenced by the decision-makers in the context of reform in the 
electricity sector. This is a strong assertion. 
 
The results support both hypotheses: the coefficient on the policy indicator and the 
coefficient on the risk indicator are significant and have the expected signs. In addition, 
some regional effects are detected, suggesting that countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are more prone to reform while countries in the Middle East and Africa are 
more likely to have taken fewer reform steps. 
 
Decisions concerning energy policy, such as choice of fuel for generation, are left out of 
the analysis, as is the size of the market. Other independent variables are in per capita 
terms. Similarly the key reform steps are assumed to be independent of the size and 
previous structure of the ESI. It would also be of interest to separate macroeconomic 
policy from institutions, i.e., to examine the extent to which macroeconomic policies 
matter after controlling for institutions. In addition, empirical studies of electricity 
sector reforms are often constrained by the availability and quality of data and the 
absence of dynamics in them. Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) study is limited to cross-
section regression analysis of data for 1998 but a temporal dimension could clearly 
strengthen the validity of the findings. 
 
                                                 
1 The only variable specific to the sector is the annual growth rate of energy use per capita (MWh per 
capita), which is an independent variable in the model. 
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In contrast to Bacon and Beasnt-Jones’ ahistorical approach, taking into account the fact 
that reforms must be designed in the context of previous policy commitments, we can 
test the effect of energy endowment, dependency on fuel imports or environmental 
commitment. Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) test the correlation between energy 
dependency and the choice of liberalisation model, as well as between commitments 
concerning the environment and the choice of liberalisation model. The paper also 
incorporates the date in which reforms started – for each year of delay (relative to the 
1990 benchmark) half a point is deducted from the liberalisation index. The study is 
limited to a cross-section analysis, and a time effect is not explicitly incorporated into 
the model. A temporal dimension is, however, incorporated into the model in the form 
of the impact of past decisions on energy and electricity dependency, or on 
environmental commitment. 
 
Also, Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) do not see reform as a sequence of steps, but use 
two types of model: one for wholesale and one for retail market. There is no control for 
institutional conditions, macroeconomic policy, and level of development or market 
size. The only other factors included in the model are the level of prices (i.e. high prices 
induce liberalisation) and a cultural link to the United Kingdom. These are limitations 
that refer to the formulation of the model. Another drawback of the study is the very 
restricted dimensions of reform included in the liberalisation index. For instance, it does 
not take into account corporatisation, privatisation, restructuring, regulatory change and  
the introduction of an independent regulator. Further, Drillisch and Riechmann (1998) 
finds a positive link between import independence and liberalisation but, interestingly, 
the estimated overall energy independence index is more significant than the 
independency index of the electricity sector alone. The study fails to detect significant 
interdependence between environmental commitment and the choice of liberalisation 
model. 
 
Ruffin (2003) reports an econometric study of the institutional determinants of 
competition, ownership and extent of reform (dependent variables) in electricity sector 
restructuring. The institutional determinants (explanatory variables) used are different 
measures of judicial independence, distributional conflict, and economic ideology. The 
study uses a cross-section OLS regression analysis of a set of models with observations 
of up to 75 developed and developing countries that undertook some steps toward 
electricity reform during the 1990s. The study finds that the relation between judicial 
independence on the one hand, and competition and ownership on the other, is 
ambiguous; i.e. the coefficients are often insignificant or, when significant, their sign 
shifts across models. The results also suggest that greater distributional conflict is 
significantly correlated with a higher degree of monopoly, while in ownership models, 
the coefficients are mostly not significant. Moreover, the results indicate that the 
relation between economic ideology favouring competition and private ownership is 
generally positive and significant. Control variables, such as parliamentary control over 
government or per capita income, do not add much to the results. 
 
In addition, Ruffin (2003) uses institutional explanatory factors with the electricity 
reform scores (as the number of reform steps taken) reported in ESMAP (1999) which 
reflect the extent of reform, including competition and privatisation. In these models, 
judicial independence shows a positive, though not always significant, relationship with 
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reform scores. Further, distributional conflicts exhibit some positive (and significant) 
relation with the extent of reform, while economic ideology shows a positive and mostly 
significant relation with the reform score. 
 
Most countries that have introduced competition have also undertaken privatisation, so 
obtaining similar tendencies in results from the models with competition and 
privatisation is only to be expected. A separate dependent regulation variable would 
also be a suitable complement to competition and privatisation variables. The dependent 
variables in the study aggregate relevant aspects of the sector, and do not separate the 
effect of the institutional factors on potentially competitive generation and regulated 
transmission and distribution networks. The relatively low R-square values (0.14 to 
0.37) suggest that the examined institutional factors, although significant, explain a 
limited amount of the variation in the dependent variables. 
 
The study shares some of the shortcomings seen in other analyses of electricity reform. 
An important issue is the definition and construction of variables that comprise different 
components. There is also a temporal problem: the dependent variables seem to be 
calculated for 1998, while the variables that are used for the computation of the 
independent and control variables are for different time periods. The study does not treat 
the endogeneity that this is likely to exist in this context. In addition, the study presents 
only R squares or p values for the regressions. For example, the Likelihood Ratio test 
could be used to examine the significance of the whole regression (where the null is 
specified so that all coefficients are zero and therefore the regression has no power in 
explaining the phenomenon). 
 
While some studies examine the determinants of reforms, others focus on the effect of 
various aspects of reform (e.g. regulation, restructuring, and privatisation) on the 
performance of the sector. Steiner (2001) tests whether the regulatory environment, the 
degree of vertical integration and the degree of private ownership have an impact on 
efficiency and on prices. Efficiency is measured by capacity utilisation rate and reserve 
margin in electricity generation. Liberalising regulation, restructuring and private 
ownership are expected to lead to improved efficiency, and lower industrial electricity 
prices and industrial/residential price ratios. These hypotheses are tested for a panel 
dataset of 19 OECD countries for the period 1987-1996. There are controls for previous 
commitment to generation technology and the control for GDP serves as proxy for 
electricity market size. There are no controls for institutions or for macroeconomic 
policy. 
 
Steiner (2001) finds that utilisation rate is positively and significantly correlated with 
both private ownership and unbundling of generation and transmission. The coefficient 
on third-party-access, however, is not significant. The results also confirm the 
hypothesis for the reserve margin, with the exception of third-party-access, which is 
again statistically insignificant. With respect to the impact on prices, the estimated 
coefficients on unbundling of generation and transmission, and on third party access are 
not significant. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on ownership is positive and 
significant, which suggests that private ownership is not necessarily correlated with 
increased competition. The establishment of a spot market was found to lead to lower 
prices. The results of the price ratio indicate that the benefits of reform are 
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disproportionally realised by industrial customers. This is in line with efficient price 
rebalancing but this does raise the important political issue in many countries: that large 
customers are seen to disproportionately benefit from relative price changes following 
reform. 
 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) argue that the precise definitions of the ind icators are critical 
to this kind of empirical work. This paper reproduces Steiner’s model for the same 
sample of countries, but for the period 1987-1999, changing slightly the definitions of 
regulatory reform indicators. In contrast to Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) 
find that the existence of a wholesale market is statistically significantly positive for 
prices. In addition, third party access is statistically significantly negative in Hattori and 
Tsutsui (2003) and statistically insignificant in Steiner (2001). Also, in contrast to 
Steiner’s results, the sign of the private ownership coefficient is found to be 
significantly negative for prices. The sensitivity of results to subtle changes in the 
definitions of variables recommends caution in the specification of reform and 
performance variables. Therefore, as well as specifying the appropriate model to test 
relevant hypotheses, one should carefully consider how to define variables, especially 
how to represent the various dimensions of reform. 
 
Another problem is the absence of considerations over market power. We expect market 
power to have an impact on performance but this is not controlled for in these studies. 
In addition, due to unavailability of data the impact on quality of service is not 
incorporated. Given the importance of quality to electricity customers in terms of 
security and reliability, this is a serious drawback that can only be tackled by better 
cross-country data – in particular, on the number and duration of power outages per 
year. Finally, there are the problems of time span and choice of sample. Considering the 
timing of reforms and the time span of these studies, privatisation often has the largest 
impact. The expansion of the time span would probably be useful to identify the effects 
of privatisation, restructuring, deregulation and competition. It would also be interesting 
to see to what extent the results hold for developing countries. 
 
With respect to model specification and estimation, both Steiner (2001) and Hattori and 
Tsutsui (2003) use the same basic framework: a model that explains each performance 
measure as a function of country-specific effects, a set of controls – i.e. independent 
variables that influence performance but are not directly related to reforms – and a set of 
regulatory reform indicators. While Steiner (2001) only presents the results for random 
effects models, Hattori and Tsutsui (2003) presents results for both random and fixed 
effects estimation. Econometric theory suggests that fixed-effects model is an 
appropriate specification if we are focusing on a specific set of individuals (in our case, 
countries), and our inference is restricted to the behaviour of this set of individuals (see 
Baltagi, 1995). In contrast, the random-effects specification is appropriate when 
drawing individuals randomly from a larger population. If we consider (as in Steiner, 
2001) that the relevant sample of OECD countries is drawn from a much larger 
population of OECD and non-OECD countries, the random effects specification is  
preferred. This approach can be strengthened by performing a Hausman test.2 For both 
studies, the test indicates that a random-effects model should be chosen. 
                                                 
2 A specification test for fixed vs. random effects used with fixed-effect models. A large test statistic 
value indicates that fixed-effect specification id preferable. 
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Both studies do not include time effects, which are more relevant the longer the time 
series used, and the analyses take place in a static framework. However, perhaps the 
most serious caveat in the specifications is common to much of the econometric 
literature on policy impacts: the problem of endogeneity of the right-hand 
“independent” variables. As emphasised in Section 3, sector performance is not only 
influenced by reforms (Equation 1) but it can also influence the reform decisions 
(Equation 2). The standard remedy for endogeneity in a single equation context is to use 
instrumental variables. However, the challenge for the empirical literature is to identify 
appropriate instruments in the context of electricity reforms or to provide more carefully 
specified models that address the endogeneity problem. The problem of endogeneity in 
a dynamic context in which policy decisions can be influenced by past performance is a 
relevant research issue. 
 
While the previous studies examine the impact of reforms on OECD countries, Zhang, 
Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) aim to identify the effects of particular aspects of reform 
in developing countries. This study tests whether privatisation leads to higher operating 
efficiency and capacity utilisation, and to higher residential and lower industrial prices. 
Competition, it is hypothesised, should lead to larger capacity, higher output and greater 
labour productivity, and to higher residential and lower industrial prices. The existence 
of an independent regulator is expected to improve productive efficiency and to lead to 
higher residential prices. Privatisation with supportive regulatory framework in the form 
of independent regulation and commitment should lead to higher output and capacity. 
There are no controls for institutions and only limited controls for country economic 
conditions (e.g. GDP per capita, urbanisation, economic freedom, and industrial output 
as a percentage of the GDP). The absence of controls for macroeconomic reforms is 
especially serious as sector liberalisation in developing countries has often been 
accompanied or even preceded by extensive macro reforms. Perhaps the most 
significant drawback of this study is the use of 1/0 dummies to represent key variables 
of reform. Such a representation of privatisation places a leading reform country like 
Argentina in the same category as lagging performer such as Bulgaria. It is also the case 
that simple measures of regulatory independence need to be better specified, as nominal 
independence of regulator without transfer of key powers, such as final authority in 
price setting, will be misleading as to the true nature of regulation. Better data can help 
alleviate this type of problem, as can detailed case studies which can suggest what were 
the crucial powers of the regulator and particular combination of circumstances which 
led to successful or unsuccessful reforms. 
 
Concerning the model specification, Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) propose 
(based on the argument that the sample is large relative to the entire population, and 
supported by a Hausman test) a fixed-effects model to account for unobservable country 
characteristics. Besides the more usual static panel model specification, the study 
estimates an equation including the combined effects of regulation and competition, and 
of regulation and privatisation. Another point that differentiates the specification in this 
study from studies is the use of a semi- logarithmic functional form. Although the choice 
of functional form is not completely resolved in the literature (and it is influenced by the 
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desire to achieve a better fit), one can argue that for low levels of reforms the impact of 
strengthening reforms is higher (Gutiérrez, 2003). In addition, as pointed in the study, 
another advantage of using the log- linear transformation is that it enables one to 
compute directly the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the independent 
variable. As in Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2003), time effects are not 
included – the time span is larger, and it is easier to identify the shocks that affected all 
developing countries during the period – and the problem of endogeneity remains 
untackled. This is a major problem because liberalisation takes time to have an impact 
and the impact may be cumulative. Countries which liberalised early are more likely to 
show an impact in this study than those that liberalised towards the end of the period 
considered. 
 
The results of Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) suggest that, if ownership change is 
to significantly improve performance, privatisation should be accompanied by 
competition and independent regulation. It is somewhat difficult to interpret the results 
as the regulation variable is mostly insignificant in the reported regressions, and when it 
is significant, and counterintuitive, regulation and competition together reduce 
efficiency. It should be noted, however, that in this study, measures of performance are 
rather crude single factor efficiency measures (electricity generation per capita, 
electricity generation per employee and capacity per capita) rather than cost per unit of 
electricity. The study rejects the hypothesis that privatisation per se leads to higher 
operating efficiency in terms of labour productivity. However, capacity utilisation does 
improve under privatisation, independently of competition and regulation. Consistent 
with another hypothesis, results suggest that privatisation will lead to increased capacity 
and consequently higher output, provided that there is a supportive regulatory regime in 
place. With respect to the effect on prices, the estimated coefficients are not significant 
for privatisation, and there is only partial support for the hypothesis that competition 
will lower industrial prices. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that 
competition leads to higher capacity, output and labour productivity. The direction of 
the effect of having an independent regulator on productive efficiency is ambiguous (in 
the absence of privatisation). In addition, the estimation does not support the hypothesis 
that regulation will raise prices to domestic consumers. Although this study gives some 
plausible results it clearly does not address issues of simultaneity and it uses some 
problematic measurements of the underlying variables of interest. 
 
Wolak (1997) tests the impact of market rules and market structure on the properties of 
spot prices. The econometric analysis is carried out in the context of specific countries – 
England & Wales, Australia, Norway & Sweden, and New Zealand. The study proposes 
a time series framework (a VAR model) to capture price movements in each market. 
The objective is to examine the relationship between market rules and market structure, 
and the behaviour of prices. The approach shifts the focus to price volatility, an aspect 
particularly important for developing countries and one that is usually absent – in the 
literature there seems to be a consistent focus on levels rather than growth rates. The 
study suggests that market structure and market rules both exert strong influences on the 
behaviour of prices, but further research is required to disentangle the two factors. In 
order to arrive at a better understanding of how the interaction of market rules and 
market structure allow the exercise of market power, a larger time series would be 
useful, especially one with comparable pre- and post-reform data. Also, the sample is 
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small and limited to developed countries. However, in order to extend the analysis to a 
larger sample more controls would have to be included. 
 
One of the main drivers of reform in developing countries is the need to transfer the 
investment burden to the private sector, so the impact reforms exert on investment is a 
relevant topic for empirical analysis. Holborn (2001), Zelner and Henisz (2000) and 
Bergara, Henisz and Spiller (1997) focus on how political conditions and institutions 
influence firm-level investment decisions. 
 
Holborn (2001) tests whether the probability of an individual firm’s entry to a specific 
market increases with the amount of its prior experience on the same type of market. 
The firm’s decision is influenced by the risk of expropriation, which in turn, is affected 
by previous experience. In contrast to the above studies, the dependent variable here is 
firm-level: the firm’s decision to enter a specific country in a given year. A standard 
probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Different model specifications are 
estimated in an attempt to capture both the isolated and combined impact of 
independent variables. If the study includes country, market and institutional conditions, 
it fails to include all relevant aspects of reform. Important aspects of reform such as the 
type of regulation, vertical or horizontal unbundling are not included. Neither does the 
study examine the exit of firms from markets, assuming that firms do not exit countries 
they had previously entered. 
 
Holborn’s results support the hypothesis tested, suggesting that experience has a 
substantial impact on the probability of entry, but firms tend to concentrate on one type 
of market environment (either a competitive market or a monopsony). Experience in 
one type of market does not seem to spill over into investments in the opposite type of 
market. 
 
Another relevant hypothesis to be tested with respect to investment is whether well-
defined and credible political institutions are positively correlated with investment. The 
rationale behind this hypothesis is that with such an institutional framework, the risk of 
political expropriation is low. Bergara, Henisz and Spiller (1997) test this hypothesis for 
a reasonable sample of developed and developing countries, but only for one year, 1987. 
The results support the hypothesis and are not sensitive to the specific definition of the 
political variable used. Unfortunately they do not include post-reform data when private 
investments would be more sensitive to political and institutional factors. Another 
drawback is the use of generation capacity as a proxy for investment. This is a 
potentially serious measurement problem especially as the composition of investment 
between generation, transmission and distribution is likely to vary significantly from 
country to country. Some questions require further research: how do institutional 
conditions shape investment decisions? Are there any other factors that matter for the 
investment decision? Importantly, to what extent do investments improve institutional 
quality and reverse the causal relationship assumed in this paper? 
 
Zelner and Henisz (2000) test whether the level of interest group competition has any 
impact on how institutions constrain investment decisions. The ratio of industrial to 
total electricity consumption is defined as a proxy for interest group competition and 
used as an independent variable. Zelner and Henisz (2000) test two types of hypothesis: 
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first, when facing strong interest group competition a utility will invest more in the 
presence of higher political constraints, ceteris paribus; second, when operating in an 
environment with relatively low political constraints a utility will invest more in the 
presence of weak interest group competition, ceteris paribus. The results suggest a 
conclusion that departs from the traditional institutional literature – when industrial 
representation among consumers is low, utilities would rather have lower political 
constraints. Therefore, there is more than political constraints to take into account when 
deciding on where, or how much, to invest. Again caution should be exercised when 
analysing these results, especially because they are based on crude constructions of 
political and group competition variables.3 Besides, although the time span of the study 
is relatively long (1970-1994), the study does not control for any aspect of electricity 
liberalisation. 
 
The econometric specification in Zelner and Henisz (2000) is sophisticated in 
comparison to other studies discussed so far. The panel model includes both country and 
time effects, and the problem of endogeneity is addressed by the use of time lagged 
variables which function as instruments. This introduces some dynamics into the 
analysis. Since the goal is to measure the impact of the level of political constraints on 
investment, conditional on the level of interest group competition, as well as the impact 
of interest group competition on investment, conditional on the level of political 
constraints, the model includes multiplicative interaction terms. In order to deal with 
potential problems of country-wise serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error 
term, the study uses an estimator based on the one developed in Newey and West (1987) 
to ensure consistency.  In short, the econometric framework proposed in Zelner and 
Henisz (2000) gives valuable insight on how to improve the specification and modelling 
of the impact of reform on performance. 
 
Finally, there are hypotheses which examine the impact of market structure and 
regulation on privatisation itself. Siniscalco, Bortolotti and Fantini (2001) test whether 
vertical integration has a negative impact on the number of privatisations and on the 
aggregate proceeds of privatisation. In addition, it tests whether regulation has a positive 
impact on the number of privatisations, on the aggregate proceeds of privatisation and 
on the percentage of privatised stock. The findings support the hypotheses and suggest 
that vertical integration is significantly negatively correlated with the number of sales 
and with the aggregate proceeds of privatisation. The regulatory index is positively and 
significantly correlated with the number of sales and with privatisation proceeds. 
 
Considering that one of the main objectives of privatisation in developing countries was 
to improve the finances of the public sector, the question addressed is a relevant one – 
how Siniscalco, Bortolotti and Fantini (2001) address it is what seems to be the 
problem. There is one model specification for each dependent variable – i.e. number of 
sales, sales proceeds, and percentage of privatised stock. The first two models are 
specified as Tobit models, and the latter is based on OLS regression. The static models 
                                                 
3 The political constraint variable is constructed from information on the number of independent branches 
of government, adjusted to take into account the extent of alignment across different branches and of 
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. The interest group competition variable is simply 
the ratio of industrial to total electricity consumption. 
 
Electricity  Sector  Reform  in  Developing  Countries,,   Jamasb,,  Mota,,   Newbery,,   Pollitt 
 20
proposed are rather limited, there are no time or country effects, no controls for 
macroeconomic reform or the size of the stock market, and not much is said about the 
error structure. In addition, the main explanatory variables are dummies.4 
 
At this stage we can draw some conclusions from this brief review of econometric 
studies. First, at the current state of reforms in the electricity sector one should be able 
to work with panel datasets rather than simple cross-section models, preferably 
containing pre- and post-reform data. As observed in Fink, Mattoo, and Rathindran 
(2002), estimating a model containing time-series cross-section data usually implies a 
complicated error structure. Problems such as serial and/or contemporaneous correlation 
and heteroskedasticity should be addressed in the estimation procedure. Ignoring 
presence of serial correlation results in consistent but inefficient estimators. Similarly, 
assuming homoskedastic disturbances when heteroskedasticity is present will still result 
in consistent estimators, but correction for heteroskedasticity makes the estimation far 
more efficient (Baltagi 1995). Dealing with contemporaneous correlation across panels 
is a more complicated matter, considering the availability of data. The appropriate 
estimation that incorporates contemporaneous correlation would require as many time 
series as there are panels (in order to satisfy matrix invertibility conditions), which is 
usually not possible. For example, a dataset with panel of thirty countries would also 
require data for thirty years. 
 
Second, especially when dealing with a varied sample of (developed and developing) 
countries and a larger time series, country and time effects should be included in the 
model. These should be included in the form of fixed effects when we are focusing on a 
specific set of countries. When we are drawing individual countries randomly from a 
large population, the use of a random effects specification is appropriate. To strengthen 
our choice we should perform a specification test (Hausman’s test). 
 
Finally, further empirical research should concentrate efforts in targeting the problem of 
endogeneity. This has been attempted for the telecommunications sector (Gutiérrez 
(2003)), but not so much for the electricity supply industry (with the exception of Zelner 
and Henisz (2000) of the papers reviewed in this Subsection). As suggested by our 
conceptual reform model outlined in Section 3, performance is not only influenced by 
reforms but also itself influences reform decisions. Gutiérrez (2003) proposes a dynamic 
model that uses lagged variables as instruments and show that neglecting the effect of 
lagged dependent variables may distort or overestimate the effects of all variables, 
including reform variables. Dynamic panel data modelling and estimation is one way to 
tackle the problem; however the estimation itself is not so straightforward when the 
time span is limited (as is usually the case for policy analysis). However, this problem 
becomes more tractable over time as datasets become larger. 
 
 
 
4.2 Efficiency studies 
 
                                                 
4 The proposed regulatory index is actually the result of the interaction of three dummy variables. In 
addition, there is a dummy for vertical integration. 
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A number of studies have attempted to analyse the effect of reform on productive 
efficiency. The methods used can be classified into three categories: econometric 
production or cost models, total factor productivity (TFP) indices and frontier 
methodologies. In general the first two methods provides measures of technical change 
or TFP, assuming all firms are technically efficient. In contrast, frontier methodologies 
do not assume that all firms are technically efficient and, by the construction of a cost or 
production frontier, measure efficiency as the distance to the frontier. Therefore, each 
individual firm is benchmarked against best practice. Frontier methodologies also make 
possible the distinction between technical change (frontier shift) and efficiency change 
(move towards the frontier).5 There are two widely used methods of constructing a 
frontier: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). 
DEA uses linear programming to calculate the frontier and SFA uses econometric 
methods to estimate the best practice or frontier. 
 
Plane (1999) evaluates the impact of the privatisation of Côte d’Ivorie Electricity 
Company (CIE) on efficiency and on the distribution of welfare. Privatisation in this 
case has taken the form of a ten-year lease contract. The study uses a stochastic 
production frontier model to measure efficiency change and, in order to assess the 
distributional impact, it uses the surplus accounts method. The basic production model 
expressed gross generation (GWh) as a function of the installed generation capacity 
(MW) and the number of permanent employees.  Other tested models include the ratio 
of customers to the length of the distribution network, with a binary variable to indicate 
privatisation. Parametric and non-parametric tests cannot reject the hypothesis of a 
significant performance improvement in the post-privatisation period relative to the 
immediately previous period. However, technical efficiency measures have behaved 
irregularly since privatisation. In addition, they never reach the annual values of the 
1970s when the company was under close government supervision and hard budget 
constraint. In terms of welfare distribution, the main beneficiaries were consumers 
through a substantial price decrease. At the same time quality was improved and the 
number of customers supplied was increased by over 16%. These results are even more 
striking when we consider that the private administration had a commitment to retain 
the existing workforce and the level of nominal wages. 
 
Considering that there was no restructuring (the monopoly of CIE remained unchanged) 
and the only change in the electricity sector was the privatisation of management, it is 
important to investigate what the driving forces of these positive results were and 
whether the experience can be transferred to other low-income economies, in particular 
to other Sub-Saharan countries. The author argues that the benefits stem from 
organisation innovations, especially decentralisation, reduction of hierarchy layers and 
managerial incentives. However, we observe that most of the efficiency improvement 
occurred after 1993, when a realignment of the exchange rate permitted an economic 
recovery. In addition, Plane points out that the private contractor had an interest in 
promoting similar arrangements in other African countries. More importantly, taking 
into account the long-term performance of CIE, especially under close government 
operation, it is not clear that partial privatisation was a first best solution for the country. 
                                                 
5 See Coelli et al. (1998) for a more detailed analysis on efficiency measurement. 
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Therefore, extreme caution should be exercised in the generalisation of the Côte 
d’Ivorie model. 
 
While Plane (1999) focuses on management change, other studies examine other aspects 
of reform. Arocena and Waddams-Price (1999) and Hattori (1999) analyse the impact of 
regulatory reform. Arocena and Waddams-Price (1999) evaluates the effect of change in 
regulatory schemes on thirty-three publicly and privately owned coal- fired electricity 
generation units in Spain between 1984 and 1997. The study develops a DEA model 
and uses Malmquist indices. The DEA model uses generation capacity (MW), number 
of employees and volume of fuel as inputs. Besides the usual output – production 
(MWh) – the study introduces declared availability (MWh declared available) and three 
undesirable outputs (pollutants). This innovation captures important features of the 
industry in the efficiency measure. Given that the number of private and public 
companies is somewhat limited for DEA, efficiency measures are calculated using the 
whole sample (all time periods) as well as the average plant for each sector and each 
year. The results suggest that public generators are on average more efficient under cost 
of service regulation, while private generators catch-up and overtake the public sector 
under price cap regulation. As the Spanish experience provides data of both public and 
private operation under cost of service and price cap regulation, it allows the impact of 
regulatory change on a stable ownership environment to be measured. In most cases of 
reform, regulatory change is accompanied by other aspects of reform – restructuring and 
privatisation, for example. However, in the above paper, the effect of the type of 
regulation on the form of ownership is examined independently of a reform-related 
privatisation as, during the period under study, the ownership of the generating units 
remained unchanged. 
 
Hattori (1999) assesses the impact of the 1995 regulatory reforms on the efficiency of 
Japanese electric utilities, focusing on fossil fuel generation. These reforms consist of 
the introduction of competitive tendering for new generation from IPPs, and of 
yardstick regulation which replaced the traditional rate-of-return regulation. The study 
estimates a parametric cost system by maximum likelihood. The approach models 
explicitly both technical and allocative inefficiency in the cost function, and estimates 
them together with technology parameters. The results fail to support the hypothesis of a 
positive impact of reforms on technical efficiency. However, these results should be 
taken with extreme caution. As is the case with much of the empirical literature on the 
impact of reform, Hattori (1999) draws its conclusions from the outcomes of the first 
years after reform. Actually only two years after 1995 are included. More precisely, our 
conclusion should be that regulatory reforms in Japan have not had short-term effects on 
efficiency. 
 
Delmas et al. (2003) examine the short-term impact of supply deregulation on the 
productive  efficiency of electricity utilities in the United States, and the relationship 
between the level of vertical integration and efficiency in a deregulated environment. 
The study uses DEA for the computation of efficiency scores and then develops a tobit 
model to test two hypotheses. The first is that, in the short-term, the greater the level of 
deregulation, the lower the level of technical efficiency of the utility. The second states 
that there is a U-shaped relationship between the level of vertical integration and 
efficiency. The rationale for this is that totally vertically- integrated firms are more 
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insulated from the uncertainty created by deregulation. At the other end of the spectrum, 
non- integrated utilities, by focusing on purchasing electricity in the wholesale market 
and selling it to consumers, will be able to adapt more quickly to the new deregulated 
environment. As input of the DEA model the study uses several variables to incorporate 
operating costs and capital costs, as well as the costs of electricity purchased. The 
volume of sales (MWh), discriminated by type of customer, is used as output. 
Deregulation, level of vertical integration, competition, economies of scale, mergers, 
generation technology and location are the independent variables that explain the 
behaviour of productive efficiency. 6 The results are supportive of both hypotheses. The 
limited time span of the paper is a drawback. Although its objective is to measure short-
term effects, even this could be improved if it was possible to examine the long-term 
evolution of efficiency. Also, it is not clear whether changes in fuel prices may have 
affected the results. A further problem is the number of categorical variables used to 
represent the various aspects of reform while there are no controls for economic 
changes and for state characteristics, such as urbanisation or density. 
 
It is not clear that Delmans et al.’s use of DEA is appropriate. DEA is generally most 
useful for comparison of similar activities and technologies such as distribution 
networks or specific type of power plants and suitability of the technique for mixed 
units such as vertically integrated firms is limited. Nearly 50 percent of the over 700 
observations in Delmas et al. appear to be on the efficient frontier that is a rather high 
share while a fair number of firms get very low scores. Moreover, second stage Tobit 
regression on DEA scores is generally performed for the purpose of adjusting efficiency 
scores for factors that are beyond the control of the management of the companies. 
Furthermore, statistical significance can be different from sizeable impact on measured 
relative efficiency. Finally, a lower efficiency score for a given firm in one period 
relative to an earlier period indicates a decline in relative efficiency but does not 
necessarily represent an absolute decline in the efficiency of that firm. 
 
Similarly, Pardina and Rossi (2000) study technical change in a sample of electricity 
distribution companies in South America. The technique used is the estimation of a 
stochastic frontier production function. The objective is not to study the impact of 
reforms, but to aid the setting of the X factor in a price cap regime. Nevertheless, the 
production function includes a dummy to indicate whether the firm belongs to a country 
which has already reformed its ESI. The dependent variable is the number of customers. 
Distribution network length, number of employees, service area, transformer capacity, 
the proportion of sales to residential customers, total sales, and an interaction variable 
between time and a reform dummy are the regressors. The model also includes a time 
trend. A sample of 36 distribution companies from ten South American countries should 
provide a comprehensive outline of the industry in the continent, but the data is not 
available for all years (1994-1997) for each company, and as a consequence the time-
series cross-section data is unbalanced. The results fail to reject the hypothesis of no 
change in inefficiency effects over the period 1994-1997. In addition, there is only 
partia l evidence of correlation between reforms and performance. Only when more 
interaction variables are included are the coefficients significant. There are not many 
                                                 
6 Deregulation here includes not only regulatory change but also the enforcement of restructuring or 
divestiture. 
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efficiency studies on the Latin America electricity sector, and Pardina and Rossi (2000) 
introduce data from a reasonable number of distribution companies. However, there is 
room for improvement, especially in the formulation of the reform variable and of the 
production function, and in the organisation of a more balanced dataset. 
 
Whiteman (1999) evaluates the macroeconomic impact of microeconomic reform of the 
Australian ESI. This study supplements macro considerations to the usual efficiency 
analysis. The paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
techniques to measure inefficiency. Then it introduces the calculated potential increase 
in total factor productivity (TFP) into a computable general equilibrium model (CGE). 
Besides the problems of parameterisation, one of the common criticisms to the use of 
CGE models is that they cannot incorporate all the important details of the reforms. By 
preceding the CGE experiment by efficiency analysis the problem is at least partially 
addressed. However, the paper benchmarks the performance of Australian utilities with 
an international sample and this might overestimate the potential increase. The results 
rely upon the sample used for benchmarking. The study estimates a 0.22% increase in 
GDP in the long run as a result of the reform, which is less than the direct benefit. This 
result relies on the assumption that there is no increase in aggregate employment 
stemming from microeconomic reforms. As a consequence, the benefits of the reform 
are reflected in terms of rise in real wages rather than an increase in employment. The 
increase in real wages adversely affects the terms of trade, which in its turn has a 
negative impact particularly in industries that rely heavily in exports. Hence the final 
impact is less than the direct benefit of the reform. 
 
 
3.3 Determinants of economic growth 
 
The electricity sector operates within the wider economic system. It is, therefore, 
plausible to expect that the sector is susceptible to influence from high- level country-
specific factors that influence the overall economic framework. Indeed, the components 
of the electricity reform model outlined in Figure 1 can be thought of as having 
economy-level counterparts. For example, reform measures can be likened to 
macroeconomic policies while reform performance can be compared to economic 
indicators such as income per capita. Also, institutional aspects of the sector such as 
legal basis and regulatory regime, have high- level parallels such as rule of law and 
property rights. Similarly, sector endowments such as energy resource independence is 
comparable to the countries’ geographical and resource advantage and so forth. 
 
In order to improve reform design, it is important to identify the main factors affecting 
the reforms and their performance. More specifically, it is important to enhance our 
understanding of whether or to what extent these factors (i) are sector- level or economy-
level variables, (ii) exert a direct or indirect influence, and (iii) are given or controllable 
factors? Some recent studies of determinants of economic growth have addressed these 
types of questions and can guide the design of similar studies of electricity sector 
reform. The findings of these studies emphasise imply the need to examine the 
importance of sector- level and country- level institutional factors and their interactions 
with endowments and policies. This section is not a review of the literature on economic 
Electricity  Sector  Reform  in  Developing  Countries,,   Jamasb,,  Mota,,   Newbery,,   Pollitt 
 25
growth but merely highlights the relevance for electricity sector reform of some studies 
on general economic development. 
 
For example, Easterly and Levine (2002) examine the effect of quality of institutions, 
endowments, and policies on economic development, in terms of GDP per capita for a 
large sample of countries. The study suggests that quality of institutions has significant 
influence on economic development. The findings  indicate that country endowments do 
not exhibit independent influence over economic development, rather, they have an 
indirect effect through their influence on the quality of institutions. Similarly, 
macroeconomic policies of the countries, after controlling for the effect of endowments 
on development through institutions, do not show significant effect on economic 
development. The study highlights the need to include appropriate institutional variables 
in the analysis of sector- level performance. 
 
Rodrik et al. (2002) examine the importance of institutions, geography and trade on 
income levels in a large sample of countries, and suggest relatively similar results for 
the role of institutions. The study finds that the main influence of geography on income 
level is through its effect on the quality of institutions. Also, trade does not show a 
significant independent effect on incomes, although it has a positive impact on 
institutions. The paper also points out a difference between the nature of institutional 
and policy variables when studying income levels. It argues that institutions can be 
regarded as stock variables that also represent the accumulated influence of policies 
through time as flow variables. The paper suggests that it is more appropriate to 
estimate the impact of policy variables on income growth instead of income level. 
 
In another paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) examine the effect of the 
colonial past of a sample of developing countries on the quality of institutions and 
ultimately on their level of economic development. The study finds evidence that in 
countries where the mortality rate among the European settlers were high, the 
institutions established by them were of extractive nature, that is, mainly intended to 
repatriate the profits back to their home countries. The study suggests that institutions 
have important effect on income levels and, when the effect of institutions is controlled 
for, the income levels in countries with low-quality and high-quality institutions is not 
very different. 
 
However, other studies have argued that assuming an exclusive influence from and 
through institutions on economic development, exaggerates their importance. McArthur 
and Sachs (2001) and Sachs (2003) find that geography and related variables, such as 
malaria and life expectancy at birth, can also exert independent influence on economic 
development beyond their impact through affecting the quality of institutions. Rodrik 
(2003) also offers a complementary view of policy and institutions. This view holds that 
while policies are important in order to initiate reforms, appropriate institutions are 
needed to sustain continuity and the dynamic of the reform process. 
 
In a different type of study, Cohen and Soto (2002) show that the combined effect of 
modest relative deficiencies in some key variables of economic development can 
produce considerable cross-country differences in income level. The paper uses a 
sample of developing countries where physical capital, human capital, and factor 
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productivity are approximately 70% of those of rich countries. The paper however 
suggests that the combined effect of the disadvantages in these factors result in a per 
capita income that is approximately 30% of that of rich countries. 
 
Almeida and Ferreira (2002) examine an interesting issue in the context of general 
economic performance. The study finds evidence that centralised countries have a more 
volatile economic performance than less centralised countries. Such a hypothesis has 
not been tested for sector level performance (pre-reform as well as post-reform). 
However, if this result does apply to sector level performance, then, as volatility in the 
electricity sector has considerable political, social and business implications, it need to 
be considered in the reform design. 
 
As we saw, while there is some evidence in support of the importance of institutions on 
economic development, the main sources of this influence are less certain. In the 
context of electricity, it is useful to determine what factors have an impact on the 
institutions and whether they exert an independent or indirect influence on the 
performance of reform. 
 
The aforementioned studies of the electricity sector in  Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) 
and Drillisch and Reichmann (1998) examine aspects of the role of institutions, policies, 
and endowments as determinants of reform. There is however considerable scope for 
improved modelling of institutional and country development variables in sector 
specific studies. This is important because reforms need to be appropriate for the 
general economic circumstance of the country. 
 
 
3.4  Country case studies 
 
Cross-country econometric and productivity analysis can be useful for addressing well-
defined questions associated with reform. These questions are addressed using a limited 
number of variables that are similar in measurement units and are comparable in what 
they represent. However, the issues associated with model specification and accuracy of 
variables in representing the relevant aspect of reform pose limitations on these types of 
studies. 
 
The multi- faceted nature of reforms and the varied characteristics of the sector across 
countries, mean that case studies can address issues that do not easily lend themselves to 
rigorous quantitative analysis, or could not be addressed due to lack of data. Further, 
results suggesting that, on average, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
a dependent variable and certain independent variables, have limited relevance to 
decision-makers concerned with individual sectors. Further, in electricity reform, 
dynamics, such as the implementation process, and qualitative aspects, such as 
regulation and conflict resolution are crucial and, at the same time, inherently difficult 
to capture through statistical methods. 
 
Case studies can play a complementary role in understanding complex questions and 
multi-dimensional activities such as electricity reform. A statement in Rodrik (2003) 
made in the context of general economic development is also valid in the case of 
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electricity sector reform: “Ideally, case studies can generate novel hypotheses that in 
turn suggest new cross-national tests. A claim based on case studies that does not find 
support from cross-country regressions requires close scrutiny. By the same token, any 
cross-national empirical regularity that cannot be meaningfully verified on the basis of 
country studies should be regarded as suspect” (pp. 10). 
 
The main performance tests of a reform are whether: (i) restructuring, privatisation, 
regulation, and competition result in efficiency improvement, (ii) the benefits exceed 
the associated costs, and (iii) the gains are passed on to customers. This section reviews 
the case studies of electricity sector reform. As reforms in different regions of the world 
share some common traits, the structure of this section is based on a regional divide. 
 
 
3.4.1 Latin America 
 
An intriguing aspect of electricity sector reform is that the first such reform was 
introduced in Chile in the 1980s; a developing country with a small system, weak rule 
of law and weak democracy. Generally, these qualifications are regarded as major 
obstacles to market-oriented reform with private sector participation. However, 
electricity reform in Chile appears to have fared relatively better than most other 
developing countries that reformed later despite having the benefit of experience from 
other countries. The relative success and length of the Chilean reform experience can 
provide insight on long-term performance of reform generally. 
 
Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994), in one of the first and most comprehensive 
studies of reform analyses the welfare implications of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises. The study is among the first to emphasis that privatisation of natural 
monopolies, when combined with proper regulatory framework, can be welfare-
enhancing. The majority of the cases examined in the study were taken from developing 
countries which included the privatised Chilean electricity companies ENERSIS (an 
electricity distribution company) and CHILGENER (a power generation company). The 
study finds that privatisation of the two Chilean firms produced significant new welfare 
improvements. However, the gains were achieved at a fiscal loss to the government and 
(expectedly) a welfare reduction for non-payee customers. 
 
In Chile, following the reform, operating efficiency of the electricity sector has shown 
significant improvement. For example, labour productivity in generation has increased 
and energy losses have declined (Figures 2 and 3). At the same time, there has been a 
considerable decrease in electricity prices (Figure 4). In Argentina, the installed 
generation capacity has increased and operating performance in terms of plant 
availability and labour productivity has improved (Figures 5 and 6). 
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Figure 2: Labour productivity since privatisation in leading Chilean  
electricity companies 
Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42-43) and annual reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Energy Losses (Technical and Non-Technical) 
Source: Fischer, Gutierrez and Serra (2003, p.42) Chilectra Annual Report 2002 
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Figure 4: Average node prices - SING (top) and SIC (below) systems  (2002 prices) 
Source: www.cne.cl 
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Figure 5: Thermal plant unavailability (% of capacity unavailable) 
Source: ENRE 
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Figure 6: Labour productivity in Endesa Argentina generation 
Source: Endesa Annual Report 1999 and 2002 
 
 
Since Chile, several Latin American countries have embarked on extensive economic 
reform programmes with privatisation playing a central role. A review of the 
privatisation experience in Latin America suggests that ownership change, although 
competition and effective regulation has not always been present, has improved the 
financial and operating indicators of the sectors (see ESCAP, 2001). 
 
Fisher, Gutierrez, and Serra (2003) addresses the effect of the privatising several sectors 
of the economy in Chile on efficiency of firms and social welfare. Although 
privatisation of the electricity sector was part of a larger reform program between 1985 
and 1989, the proceeds from the sale of the assets in this sector accounted for about half 
of the total proceeds in this period. Between 1988 and 2000, the installed capacity of the 
system has grown from a small size of 4,016 MW to a medium size of 10,045 MW. 
 
The study finds that since privatisation investments have risen, unit costs of declined, 
energy losses have fallen, labour productivity has increased and end-user prices have 
declined (although mostly due to lower fuel prices). However, it is noted that prior to 
privatisation, while the firms were making large losses around 1974, by the time of 
privatisation they had become profitable. The study finds a moderate profit increase in 
generating firms. The profits in the distribution firms, where regulation has been 
relatively weak, appear to have been stronger. The study concludes that regulators have 
been unable to pass all the benefits to customers. 
 
The study shares a common shortcoming of multi-sector case studies. While it is useful 
to view the reform aspects in specific sectors in a larger context of economic reforms, 
there tends to be a trade-off in the form of limited in-depth analysis of individual 
sectors. The paper compares the before and after performance of the major electricity 
firms using t statistics. However, a counterfactual for the post privatisation period is not 
considered, and there is no formal analytical linkage between the performance 
improvements on the one hand, and the impact of price reductions on consumer welfare 
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and distributional effects on the other. Also, there is a lack of clarity on the extent to 
which some general statements on regulated and non-regulated firms apply to the 
electricity companies. 
 
Paredes (2001) discusses the efficiency and welfare aspects of privatisation process and 
regulation of telecommunications, electricity and water industries in Chile. The study 
indicates that electricity privatisation has led to reduced energy losses, higher profits, 
and increased access for low-income groups. Also, prices appear to have fallen 
following privatisation, although establishing the causal effect is complicated by 
hydrological conditions. It should, however, be noted that the price impact might be due 
more to the targeted subsidies and electrification policies than privatisation per se. The 
paper argues that opposition to privatisation came from better-off consumers and 
workers and was due to uncertainty. There was little opposition from the poorest groups 
due to their limited ability to mobilise political resources. The paper also argues that 
privatisation gains have overwhelmed the losses from weak regulation. Although the 
study does not contradict the main findings of Fisher et al. (2003), it shares the same 
shortcomings of the study in terms of depth and linkage between performance and 
welfare impacts. 
 
Di Tella and Dyck (2002) examine the procedure for determining the distribution tariffs 
and occurrence of strategic behaviour associated with price-cap regulation of electricity 
distribution utilities in Chile. The findings indicate that the firms’ costs were on a 
downward trend, but one year in four they were about 1.4% above trend. These cost 
reversals occurred in the year preceding a price review. The observed cost increase 
appears to lead to higher returns in stock prices of the firms. Di Tella and Dyck suggest 
that this reflects perverse incentives in the system of regulation, whereby higher costs in 
the year of price determination lead to higher prices in the following control period. 
 
Many of the problems encountered in electricity sector reform have been attributed to 
failure to establish an appropriate regulatory framework that ensure well functioning of 
the restructured sectors. Although there is an extensive literature on the importance and 
proper characteristics of regulatory frameworks, the theoretical foundations of the 
subject are less well developed. Heller and McCubbins (1996) is a systematic approach 
to the analysis of political factors influencing regulatory governance. It proposes a 
theory and model of regulatory commitment and credibility designed to promote private 
sector participation. 
 
The proposed theory is applied to a comparative qualitative study of electricity 
regulation in Chile and Argentina though the framework of the study is applicable in 
other contexts. The study examines two hypotheses: (i) assignment of agenda control 
over regulatory policy changes, the definition of revisionary regulatory policy, and the 
number of veto gates are determinants of regulatory predictability, and (ii) unity of 
purpose among policy makers and separation of powers are determinants of regulatory 
regime stability. The paper argues that both countries have arrived at relative regulatory 
stability over time. It also suggests that, while the development in Chile has been steady 
over time, the process has been more erratic in Argentina. However, the study does not 
discuss the importance of political and institutional endowments as important 
determinants of predictability and stability of regulatory regime. Moreover, the study 
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dates back to 1996 and, therefore, precedes the macroeconomic crisis that eroded much 
of the achievements of the regulatory regime in Argentina. 
 
In Argentina, the majority of state-owned firms were privatised between 1989 and 1993, 
with privatisation proceeds from the electricity sector amounted to about 25% of the 
total. Delfino and Casarin (2001) examine the welfare impacts of the program in the 
Gran Buenos Aires area of Argentina, using a family expenditure survey of about 5,000 
households. Between the time of privatisation and the end of 1999, expenditure on 
electricity in real terms for a representative small consumer (average monthly maximum 
consumption <150 KWh) increased by about 20%, while an average large user (>150 
KWh) enjoyed a tariff reduction of about 23%. The paper shows that nearly all income 
groups among the existing customers increased their consumer welfare after 
privatisation, with the exception of the lowest income group. The results indicate that 
higher income groups have, in absolute terms, benefited more than low-income groups, 
although in percentage terms, the benefits are more similar. It also finds that losses to 
the poor are lower than the reduction in variable charges to high consumption 
customers. Also, new customers enjoy higher welfare measured as the difference 
between the cost of provision of access and consumer surplus. 
 
Ennis and Pinto (2002) examine the effect of privatisation on income distribution and 
the welfare of the poor. Argentina’s macroeconomic performance in the 1990s as 
measured by inflation control, growth and budget deficit was positive, but weak on 
unemployment and inequality. Privatisation of the electricity industry resulted in 
increased collection rates and improved quality of service. Cross-subsidies were 
eliminated and the government financed some of the subsidies. Household survey data 
shows that between 1985/6 and 1996/7, the budget share of water and electricity rise 
sharply for the lower deciles. In real terms electricity prices for residential users, 
inclusive of taxes, remained stable, while pre-tax prices are 12% higher. At the same 
time, prices for industrial users decreased by about 7%. Prices were still low by 
international standards. Access to service for the poorest groups rose sharply: residential 
service in Buenos Aires area increased from 65% in 1985/6 to 99% in 1996/7. The 
estimated change in consumer surplus between 1985/86 and 1996/97 show substantial 
welfare gains, especially for lower income deciles due to increased access and lower 
prices. 
 
The paper, however, points out that the results can be sensitive to the choice of years. 
The collective fiscal effect of privatisation of electricity and other industries was also 
significant. The privatisation proceeds amounted to about one-third of the government 
bonds outstanding in 1990. The sale of assets allowed the government to repurchase 
some bonds and, thereby, reduce interest payments. The falling public debt and reduced 
expenditures on utilities was accompanied by increased social expenditures. At the same 
time, between 1992 and 1999 the dividends paid by the privatised firms amounted to an 
average of 38.5% (increasing from 12% ($US 159 mill.) in 1992 to 64.1% ($US 1,670 
mill.) in 1999) of the all dividends paid. However, it is argued that the distributional 
impact of all dividends has been limited as some individual and employees owned part 
of the issues shares. 
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The performance of the reform in Peru is somewhat more mixed. Torero and Pascó-Font 
(2003) show that privatisation and reform of the electricity sector between 1994 and 
1997 has brought about significant improvements in access to services, labour 
productivity, quality of service, and energy loss reduction. At the same time, from 1991 
to 1994 and in 1997, there was a significant decline in consumption for all income 
quintiles. This is evidently the effect of the upward price adjustments that started prior 
to privatisation. Price increases have resulted in a reduction in consumer surplus, 
although the decline has been greater for the high- income quintiles. However, it is 
noteworthy that the pre-reform tariff levels were below average operational costs of the 
sector, and the coverage ratios and resulting losses accrued to the sector in 1989, 1990 
and 1991 amounted to 39% ($US 426 mill.), 74% ($US 302 mill.), and 92% ($US 38 
mill.) respectively. 
 
The main considerations when designing wholesale electricity markets are efficient 
pricing, control of market power, and correct signals for new entry and investments. In 
Argentina and other countries such as Chile, Bolivia and Peru wholesale markets are 
structured around cost-based bidding arrangements combined with capacity payments. 
At the same time, the relatively high degree of market concentration in Latin American 
sectors has been a source of market power that can distort both short-term prices and 
long-term investments. Ferreira (2002) examines the effectiveness of the Argentinean 
market in avoiding market power and providing signals for efficient capacity expansion 
by analysing cost, price and operational data for the year. A model of optimum capacity 
expansion developed in Chao (1983) is used with data for the 1992-2001 period to 
examine the social desirability of the sector’s capacity expansion pattern. The study 
suggests that the price volatility in the last months of 2000 cannot be attributed to the 
exercise of market power. Moreover, the results indicate that the market design has 
offered proper signals for optimum technology mix and capacity. 
 
A cost-based market for bidding deviates from both the theoretical models and from 
arrangements established in developed countries. However, in the light of political and 
social sensitivities, and high economic costs of design failure, they may be a workable 
middle way. The main advantages for developing countries, are their relative ease of 
implementation and lower likelihood of extreme price fluctuations. Despite the findings 
of the study, the overall experience in several Latin American countries has not been 
free from problems. Contract renegotiations and conflicts have been common-place as a 
result of rent-seeking behaviour, complexities arising from resource-mix, and flaws in 
market design (Benavides and Fainboim, 1999; Abdala, 2001; Basañes, Saavedra and, 
Soto, 1999). 
 
Depending on market design, a degree of volatility or variability may be necessary in 
order to allow firms to cover their fixed capital costs and to encourage system 
expansion. Benavides (2003) argues that, if intervention removes quasi-rents from high-
price periods in which firms recover their capital costs firms will seek or require other 
arrangements, such as capacity payments, to finance these costs. 
 
Recent theoretical developments in regulatory economics have not been able to resolve 
the increasing demand for sustainable regulatory design and process (Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 2002). At the same time, the importance of having an appropriate 
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regulatory framework for effective competition and privatisation on the one hand, and 
transference of efficiency gains to customers on the other, is increasingly recognised 
and stressed in the reform literature (Brown, 2002). This emphasis on the importance of 
regulatory reform is also in line with the findings of the econometric studies reviewed in 
this paper. 
 
Chisari, Estache, and Romero (1997) use a fixed-price, general equilibrium model and 
data from 1990/91, 1993, and 1995 to quantify the importance of effective regulation 
when Argentina deregulated its infrastructure industries. The findings suggest that 
between 1993 and 1995 the savings from operational gains for all utilities sectors 
combined amounted to 41% of household expenditure on utility services (i.e. US$ 2.3 
billion or 0.9% of the GDP). Using a flexible-price model, the gains from efficient 
regulation are estimated at about 16% or US$ 0.9 billion. The results also suggest that 
while the operational gains (in term of percentage of household expenditures on utilities 
services) to the high- income groups were larger, gains from effective regulation also 
benefited low-income groups. Moreover, between 1993 and 1995, the gains from 
electricity generation with fixed-price and flexible-price models amounted to 0.05% and 
0.1% of the GDP, while the gains for electricity distribution amounted to 0.17% and 
0.21% respectively. 
 
Mota (2003) also stresses the importance of regulation on welfare distribution. The 
paper presents a social cost-benefit analysis of privatisation of electricity distribution 
utilities in Brazil between 1993 and 2000. The paper found significant efficiency gains 
from cost savings and increased labour productivity. The estimated efficiency gains 
amount to about $US 12 billion. of which approximately $US 2.2 billion accrued to 
consumers (at 12% discount rate). The results indicate that, although consumer surplus 
showed signs of growth, companies were allowed to retain most of the achieved gains. 
These findings are in line with a shortcoming of the reform design: tariff restructuring 
and privatisation occurred before a regulatory agency was established. 
 
Estache, Guasch, and Trujillo (2003) argue that price-cap regulation in privatised 
sectors in Latin America has generally not been very successful. The paper argues that 
firms have improved efficiency under price cap regime, but price-caps have tended to 
increase the cost of capital, and hence, tariffs. At the same time, due to regulatory 
weakness and lack of government commitment, as is the case of electricity distribution 
utilities in Argentina, much of the gains have either remained with companies or have 
been captured by the government. 
 
Low rates of public approval for reform may be linked to an inequitable distribution and 
low level of customer gain. Lora and Panizza (2002) refer to surveys of public opinion 
in 17 countries in the region that show a growing disapproval of the reforms, in 
particular among the middle classes. Without visible benefits and strong support from 
public opinion the sustainability of the reform process can easily be undermined. At the 
same time, it may be argued that some mistakes and problems are inevitable during the 
early years of reform. 
 
For example, with regard to incentive regulation of distribution networks, the initial 
price-caps appear to have underestimated the cost saving potential of the utilities and/or 
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tended to focus on ensuring the viability of the new regime, rather than focusing on 
distributional aspect. This has even been the case in the first distribution price control in 
the UK which led to windfall profits for privatised companies and the subsequent 
introduction of windfall taxes. Therefore, the source of much of the problems may be 
lack of experience and implementation of regulation rather than the failure of the 
regulation models per se. 
 
Easterly and Servén (2003a) in a set of studies examine aspects of privatization and 
changes in the stock of infrastructure assets in Latin America during the 1980s and 
1990s. Calderón, Easterly, and Servén (2003a) argue that, during this period, the 
stabilisation programmes adopted in Latin America resulted in disproportionate 
investment cutbacks in, and maintenance of, infrastructure assets. Consequently, the gap 
in the stock of infrastructure assets (including electricity) between LAC and those of 
Asian and OECD economies widened significantly. As the economic return on 
infrastructure assets in LDCs is considerably higher than their borrowing cost, the 
spending cuts have had a negative effect on inter-temporal public budgets and long-term 
prospects of economic growth. The paper suggests that, overall, electricity generation 
capacity per worker in Latin America has been lower, while network losses have been 
higher, than in the Asian economies. Also, most countries witnessed a decline in their 
total and public investment in the sector. Although private investment rose in nearly all 
countries, the per capita investment did not reach the pre-reform levels of public 
investment. 
 
The study also reports rather counterintuitive results from regression of energy losses as 
a percentage of output (as proxy for the quality of electricity assets) on the share of 
private expenditure on electricity. The negative coefficient signs suggest that higher 
private expenditure are correlated with higher losses. Recognising this unexpected 
result, the paper suggests that this may be a consequence of heterogeneity among public 
and private projects, or that governments have tended to privatise the least efficient 
firms. A more plausible explanation is, however, a possible disconnection between the 
losses and private share of expenditure. Most energy losses occur in the transmission 
and distribution networks, whereas most private expenditure in the sector has been in 
the generation business. Furthermore, energy losses are not good proxy for quality, but 
rather reflect network technical and non-technical efficiency. A subsequent regression 
using 10-year averages of the same variables found a weak tendency toward quality 
improvement. 
 
Calderón and Servén (2003) estimate the output cost (in terms of GDP per worker) of 
the widened gap in infrastructure assets in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America. The 
paper employs different econometric techniques and model specifications in regressions 
of electricity generation capacity, telecommunications (main phone lines) and transport 
(roads) assets, as well as measures of human and physical capital as instruments. The 
simpler OLS regressions do not produce strong results. However, the results from the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) technique show that infrastructure assets are 
significantly correlated with GDP per worker. The paper then estimates that about 30 
percent of the output cost incurred in Latin America is associated with the gap in 
infrastructure assets, and that about 50 percent of this can be attributed to electricity 
generation assets. 
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Calderón, Easterly, and Servén (2003b) estimate the effects of the cuts in infrastructure 
expenditure on public sector solvency. The findings suggest that the cutbacks have a 
significant effect on growth and future public revenues and, therefore, should be 
carefully weighted against alternative spending reductions. The estimates suggest that a 
permanent cut in electricity generation spending, amounting to 1 percent of GDP, 
impacts the annualised public net worth between 1 and 0.17 percent (for public 
debt/GDP ratios ranging from 0 to 0.7). 
 
 
3.4.2 The UK electricity reform 
 
Few reforms have experienced such scrutiny as that in the UK. While the UK is not a 
developing country, the timing and characteristics of electricity sector restructuring and 
privatisation in the UK has provided insights into some important aspects of reform. For 
example, that the process of restructuring and regulation may face initial problems but, 
nevertheless, can continue to evolve into a workable market-oriented system (see e.g. 
Newbery, 1999). 
 
In particular, the UK experience with restructuring of generation and mitigating possible 
market power has demonstrated the complexity and challenges involved in introducing 
competition into the sector. Green and Newbery (1992) show that the initial structure 
based on only two unequal competing generators was inefficient and that five equal 
competing firms would be more effective. Wolfram (1999) shows that although prices 
under oligopoly appear to have been above marginal costs, regulatory constraints, threat 
of new entry, and financial contracts may have produced lower prices than theory would 
suggest. At the same time, Sweeting (2001) shows that, between 1995 and 2000, 
generation asset divestitures and new entry did not result in lower prices. 
 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) estimate the costs and benefits of restructuring the state-
owned Central Electricity Generation Board (CEGB), the enterprise in charge of 
electricity transmission and generation in England and Wales that was privatised in 
1990. The study uses data for the 1989/90-1995/96 period and compares the post-
privatisation performance of the CEGB relative to a counterfactual scenario without 
restructuring. There has been considerable improvement in labour productivity in the 
post-restructuring period, and the authors suggest that most of the efficiency gains came 
from non-fuel costs. They estimate future net efficiency gains from restructuring and 
privatisation of the CEGB at £9.6 billion (6% discount rate) or £5.2 billion (10% 
discount rate) after taking into account restructuring costs at £2.8 billion (6% discount 
rate) or £3.2 billion (10% discount rate).7 In comparison, the proceeds from the sale of 
CEGB’s assets amounted to about £9.7 billion. Also, the net welfare effect of 
restructuring and privatisation are then estimated at £4.8 billion (6% discount rate) or 
£4.3 billion (10% discount rate), after accounting for consumer losses of £1.3 billion 
(6% discount rate) or £2.2 billion (10% discount rate) which resulted from subsequent 
price increases. 
                                                 
7 The estimates are for the more probable counter-factual scenario under which CEGB would have 
continued to behave as in the past. 
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Reform in the rest of the UK also offers an insight into the possible effects of structure 
and market design on the performance of reform. Pollitt (1997, 1999) applies a similar 
social cost-benefit analysis methodology, similar to that in Newbery and Pollitt (1997), 
to the Scottish and the Northern Ireland systems. The Scottish system consisted of two 
vertically integrated companies that were privatised without restructuring, and a state-
owned nuclear power company that was sold as part of the state-owned British energy 
in 1996. Pollitt (1999) estimates that the efficiency gains from privatisation in the 
Scottish system, under the more probable counterfactual scenario, were relatively small 
at about 10% of turnover (compared to 50% in England and Wales). Moreover, the costs 
of restructuring were almost equal to the efficiency gains. 
 
An alternative “pro-public” scenario based on the assumption that the same firms were 
under public ownership but had initiated similar measures (such as closure of inefficient 
nuclear plants and expansion of the interconnection capacity to the south), found the 
total efficiency gains were almost zero and the discounted loss amounted to 74% of 
turnover. The distribution effect of the reform was more uneven than that in England  
and Wales. The estimated loss to consumers amounted to approximately £1.5 billion or 
80% of turnover (compared to 8% in England and Wales). Proceeds from the sale of the 
assets were £3.6 billion, while the estimated loss of revenue stream amounted to £5.2 
billion (excluding the subsequent windfall tax). The estimated profit stream to the new 
owners was £6.7, compared to the £3.6 billion price that was paid for the assets. 
 
Reform in Northern Ireland followed a different path. The power generation units were 
sold through trade sale as three separate companies, each having long-term power 
purchase agreements with the transmission and distribution utility. The generating 
companies achieved significant efficiency improvements, although the power purchase 
agreements meant that the savings could not be passed to consumers. Pollitt (1999) 
estimates the gains in the generation companies at approximately £1 billion or 195% of 
turnover (compared with 55% in England and Wales), but restructuring costs were high 
and amounted to £0.1 billion. 
 
The distributional impacts of reform were again uneven, but consumers benefited to the 
tune of £1 billion after intervention through a price review resulted in significant price 
reductions. Government proceeds from the sale of assets were £0.9 billion compared to 
future foregone revenue streams of £0.1 billion. At the same time, the new owners of 
the companies incurred a loss of £0.4 billion as a result of the price review. 
 
Domah and Pollitt (2001) focus on the impact of reform on the distribution networks. 
The study presents a social cost benefit study of privatisation and regulatory reform of 
the regional electricity distribution companies in England and Wales at the end of 1990. 
It uses the actual data for the 1985/86-1997/98 period and cost predictions into 2005. 
The paper also points out that, in the first few years following the reform, both costs, 
prices, and profits rose. In subsequent years, costs began to fall. However, the 
distribution of efficiency gains was initially uneven; benefits remained with the 
companies, generating large profits, which eventually led to the imposition of special 
windfall taxes. It was not until around 2000 that consumers began to benefit from 
efficiency gains. The paper estimates that the benefits to customers were equivalent to 
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3% price reductions, while the government gained about £5 billion in privatisation 
proceeds and taxes. 
 
 
4 Summary of tested hypothesis and variables 
 
4.1 Econometric studies 
 
In relation to the generic model of electricity sector reform analysis outlined in Section 
2, the existing empirical econometric studies have at best partially addressed the 
performance and determinants aspects of reform. Broadly, the findings of this literature 
may however be summarised as follows: 
· Institutional determinants of reform: Higher country policy and institutional 
quality is positively correlated with extent of reform (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 
2002). The effect of judicial independence on competition level and ownership 
type is ambiguous and/or sensitive to model specification. Market-oriented 
economic ideology is positively correlated with higher competition and private 
ownership. Distributional conflict is positively correlated with higher level of 
monopoly, and ambiguous in relation to ownership type. Judicial independence, 
economic ideology, and distributional conflict are positively correlated with the 
overall reform score (Ruffin, 2003). 
· Privatisation and efficiency: In developed countries, privatisation has improved 
operating efficiency and capital utilisation (Steiner, 2001). In developing 
countries, privatisation has improved efficiency when accompanied by 
independent regulation (Zhang et al., 2002). 
· Privatisation and prices: In developed countries, the cost-reflective-pricing effect 
of privatisation (i.e. lower industrial prices and industrial/residential price ratios) 
has been mixed and sensitive to time factor and variable definition (Steiner, 
2001; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2003); the effect in developing countries is not 
significant (Zhang, et al., 2002). 
· Competition and efficiency: In developing countries, competition has resulted in 
improved operating and capital efficiency (Zhang et al., 2002). 
· Competition and prices: The evidence of the effect of competition on cost 
reflective pricing (i.e. lower industrial tariffs and higher residential tariffs) in 
developing countries is weak (Zhang, et al. 2002). The price effect of 
competition in developed countries is mixed and sensitive to time factor and 
variable definition (Steiner, 2001; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2003). 
· Regulation and efficiency: Independent regulation alone has not led to efficiency 
improvement in developing or developed countries (Zhang, 2002; Steiner, 
2001). 
· Regulation and prices: In developing countries, the effect of independent  
regulation on cost reflective pricing is insignificant (Zhang et al, 2002). 
· Market opening, access, and prices: In developed countries, TPA and retail 
access tend to result in lower industrial prices and ratios to residential users 
(Steiner, 2001; Hattori, 2003). 
· Investments and institutions: Private investment in the sector is positively 
correlated with credible institutional factors such as protection of property 
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rights, judicial and regulatory independence and country political risk (Bergara 
et al. 1997; Holborn, 2001; Zelner and Hensiz, 2000).  
· Vertical integration and privatisation: Vertical integration has a negative effect 
on the number of, and proceeds from, privatisation while regulation tends to 
increase the number of, proceeds from and level of, privatisation (Siniscalco, et 
al. 2001). 
· Market design and price volatility: Systems with large private participation have 
more price volatility but lower mean prices. Also, in electricity systems with 
mandatory participation in the wholesale market, spot price volatility is higher 
(Wolak, 1997). 
 
It should be noted that that there has been limited cross-testing of most of the 
hypotheses across the studies, so further analysis is necessary to increase confidence in 
the results. There is also reason to question the robustness of some of the empirical 
findings as the comparability of the studies is constrained by variations in data and 
model specifications.  
 
Even where there is a rather high degree of comparability, sensitivity of the findings to 
the choice and definition of variables and model specification, casts considerable 
uncertainty over the policy relevance of the existing body of knowledge. It is 
remarkable that, after so long, there is still very little systematic analysis and evidence 
on electricity reform. 
 
 
4.2 Efficiency and productivity studies 
 
The full potential of productivity analysis techniques for examining the performance of 
reform is yet to be recoginsed. Findings from the limited number of existing reform-
related studies present a mixed picture of performance. Results of the reviewed studies 
can be summarised as follows: 
· A sample of Latin American distribution companies suggests only partial 
evidence of correlation between reform and performance (Pardina and Rossi, 
2000). 
· In Cote d’Ivore, privatisation has resulted in efficiency improvement. However, 
performance remains below the 1970’s level when the electricity sector was 
under close government supervision and subject to hard budget constraints 
(Plane, 1999). 
· In the US, deregulation has resulted in a short-term decline in productive 
efficiency. Also, the vertically integrated utilities and companies that rely on the 
market for their electricity supplies are more efficient than those with hybrid 
structures (Delmas and Tokat, 2003). 
· In Spain, public electricity generators are, on average, more efficient under cost 
of service regulation, while private generators catch-up and overtake the public 
firms under price cap regulation (Arocena and Waddams-Price,1999). 
· In Japan, the results do not support the hypothesis of increased technical 
efficiency among fossil fuel generators from the 1995 regulatory reform 
(Hattori, 1999). 
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· In Australia, the long-term macroeconomic gain from electricity reform is 
estimated at 0.22% of GDP (Whiteman, 1999). 
· In Brazil, privatisation of distribution utilities lead to considerable efficiency 
gains which were, due to ineffective regulation, mainly retained by the 
companies (Mota, 2003). 
 
 
4.3 Case studies 
 
The main lessons from the single country and cross-country case studies can be 
summarised as follows: 
· Efficiency gain: In Chile, privatisation resulted in higher investment, lower unit 
costs, lower energy losses and higher labour productivity (Paredes, 2001; Fisher 
et al., 2003). In Peru, significant improvements were achieved in loss reduction, 
quality of service, labour productivity and access. Tariff re-balancing meant 
higher prices, lower consumption and welfare surplus to consumers which 
benefited high- income users most (Torero and Pasco-Font, 2003). 
· Distributional effect: In Chile, privatisation produced significant welfare 
improvements. However, there was a fiscal loss to the government and welfare 
reduction for non-payee customers (Galal, 1994). 
· Low-income groups: The evidence is not conclusive on whether the poorest 
income groups have been better or worse off (Delfino and Casarin, 2001; .Ennis 
and Pinto, 2002; Chisari et al. 1997). 
· Improved access: Policies aimed at improving access to service can be effective 
and combined with privatisation (Ennis and Pinto, 2002; Delfino and Casarin, 
2001). 
· Weak regulation: In Chile, weak regulation of network utilities resulted in 
distribution firms earning higher profits than generation firms (Fisher et al., 
2003). In Brazil, most of the benefits remained in the companies (Mota, 2003). 
This may explain the increasing decline of public approval for privatisation in 
Latin America (Lora and Panizza, 2002). In the UK, customers began to benefit 
after further regulatory action (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Domah and Pollitt, 
2000; Pollitt, 1997; Pollitt 1999). 
· Credibility and commitment: Regulatory credibility and political commitment 
are important, as shown in Chile and Argentina (Heller et al., 1996). However, 
in both countries the majority of customers (with the possible exception of the 
poorest groups) enjoyed lower (or little changed) tariffs or welfare gain 
following privatisation. Sustainable regulatory commitment in countries where 
tariffs should increase will be much harder to achieve. 
· Wholesale market design: Cost-based wholesale markets may be relatively 
effective in reducing price volatility and market power, as shown by Ferreira 
(2002) in Argentina. 
· Incentive regulation: Price-caps may be effective but, with weak regulation, may 
lead to strategic behaviour by regulated distribution firms gaming the model (Di 
Tella and Dyck, 2002; Estache et al., 2003). 
· Financial markets: Privatisation can increase the size of the stock markets as in 
the case of Argentina  (Ennis and Pinto, 2002).
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· Economic significance of electricity assets: In Latin America, despite private 
investment in the sector, total investment declined and the gap in the stock of 
electricity assets relative to Asian and OECD countries widened (Calderón et al., 
2003a). About 15 percent of the output cost incurred in Latin America can be 
attributed to a decline in electricity generation assets (Calderón and Servén, 
2003). Cutbacks in spending on electricity assets have significant negative effect 
on long-term growth and future public revenues (Calderón et al., 2003b). 
 
 
5. Summary of untested hypothesis on reforms  
 
The review of the literature revealed that all the studies have focused on rather narrow 
aspects of reform. Ideally, and where possible, it is preferable to employ systems of 
simultaneous equations. The main obstacles here would be data availability and model 
specification problems that may prove to be prohibitive. A second best but more 
feasible approach, is to separately test a set of coherent hypotheses that, collectively, 
can shed light on aspects of reform. 
 
In this section, we propose a number of possible hypotheses focussing on Equations (1) 
and (2) from section 3 that address a wide range of issues arising in connection with 
electricity sector reform in developing countries. Appendix 2 summarises the identified 
untested hypotheses and types of variable required. 
 
 
5.1 Performance indicators  
 
5.1.1 Investment 
 
Private investment in the sector is barely addressed in the studies reviewed. For 
developing countries, private investment is a top priority and is, perhaps, a more reliable 
measure of success or failure of price reform. At best, investment is represented by a 
proxy, e.g. generating capacity expansion as in Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller (1997). The 
relationship between private investment in (green-field projects and privatisation) may 
be examined in relation to various aspects of reform, institutional quality, market 
structure, endowments and private sector investment in other reformed infrastructure 
industries. Some of the untested hypotheses include: 
 
H.1.0: Higher economic growth and electricity demand growth lead to higher 
shares of private investment, ceteris paribus. 
H.1.1: Lower levels of activity by international finance institutions are associated 
with lower levels of domestic investment and lower shares of private 
involvement in that investment in many, but not all, developing countries. 
H.1.2: Foreign private investment is a function of effective electricity tariff reform 
(the extent to which extra investment is self-financing). 
 
Hypothesis H.1.0 reflects the observation from the telecommunications industry that 
rapid growth can reduce the demand for firm regulatory contracts. Hypothesis H.1.1 
suggests that, particularly in poorer countries, international finance organisations may 
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have a role in supporting private investment that otherwise would not have taken place. 
Hypothesis H.1.2 links private investment to the prospects of a pricing system that 
supports self-sustained investment without dependence on, or recourse, to public funds. 
 
 
5.1.2 Network regulation and privatisation 
 
The review has revealed a tendency to ignore transmission and distribution activities. In 
effect, the network parts of the sector are treated as black boxes, although there are 
considerable cross-countries differences. In LDCs in particular, many of the underlying 
problems such as system losses, non-payment, network access, electrification, are 
related to networks (especially distribution) and, in the light of unresolved problems and 
declining international investor interest, it is useful to test whether guaranteed revenues 
have facilitated distribution privatisation. 
 
H.2.0: Regulatory independence and credible arrangements have a positive effect 
on performance of T&D in terms of investment, and cost reflective prices 
H.2.1: Price/Revenue cap regulation is superior to cost-of-service regulation for 
T+D networks in terms of cost efficiency and loss minimisation. 
H.2.2: The introduction of price or revenue caps is a function of the degree of 
independence of the regulator. 
H.2.3: The presence of incentive regulation has a positive impact on investment in 
transmission and distribution (ceteris paribus). 
H.2.4: Privatisation of distribution networks improves efficiency when combined 
with incentive regulation. 
 
Hypothesis H.2.0 reflects the role of regulatory independence in promoting reform by 
reducing uncertainty and introducing price reforms. Hypotheses H.2.1-2 examine the 
origin and effectiveness of price cap regulation. Hypothesis H.2.3 addresses the 
particular issue of regulating investment in networks, as opposed to investments in 
generation, which has received relatively little attention. Hypothesis H.2.4 reflects the 
need to examine the effect of regulation on efficiency in distribution networks. 
 
 
5.1.3 System losses and quality of service 
 
Transmission and distribution losses are a major source of inefficiency in developing 
countries, but this is another network-related issue that has been under- investigated. In 
competitive markets there is a potential trade-off between profitability and quality of 
service and it would be worth testing the effect of reform on quality attributes such as 
reliability, voltage, etc. 
 
H.3.0: Privatisation is associated with lower bill arrears and reduced technical 
and non-technical losses. 
H.3.1: Reforms that provide financial incentives for loss reduction and legal 
enforcement of bill payment reduce measured losses. 
H.3.2: Privatisation is associated with increased installation of meters and 
increased pre-payment charging. 
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H.3.3: High numbers of meters/pre-payment is associated with lower levels of 
arrears and non-technical losses. 
H.3.4: Incentive regulation without clear incentives for network companies to 
maintain quality will reduce quality. 
 
Hypothesis H.3.0 examines the effect of privatisation on revenue collection at a 
distribution level that is crucial for the financial health of the whole, and on energy 
losses. Hypotheses H.3.1-3 examine whether financial incentives improve measurement, 
billing and loss reduction. Hypotheses H.3.4 examines the extent to which quality 
regulation is required to ensure that service does not deteriorate as a result of reform. 
 
 
5.1.4 Market structure  
 
Market power arises from ineffective competition and industry structure. The effect of 
vertical integration and horizontal concentration on the performance of reform is 
crucial. 
 
H.4.0: HHI of less than 2500 is required for effective, unregulated competition in 
the generation market. 
H.4.1: Joint ownership of generation and transmission/distribution reduces 
efficiency, increases prices, and may deter entry. 
H.4.2: Cost-based bidding mitigates market power and price fluctuations in 
generation markets. 
 
Hypothesis H.4.0-1 are standard industrial organisation hypotheses applied to electricity 
reform to examine the effect of market structure on behaviour and performance, 
although regulations (i.e. cost-based bidding or mandated contracting) may be able to 
adequately mitigate market power even in concentrated markets (hypothesis H.4.2). 
 
 
5.1.5 Threshold effects 
 
Many developing countries have electricity systems that are smaller than 1,000 MW. 
Surprisingly, there has been no attempt in the empirical literature to identify a size 
threshold below which certain types of reform are unlikely to be effective. This is 
extremely important in the context of small developing countries. 
 
H.5.0: There is a threshold size (which may depend on endowments) below which 
vertical separation is technically difficult, or not worthwhile, due to the 
transaction costs involved. 
 
This hypothesis examines whether effective competition can be achieved in small 
systems and whether the potential benefits exceed the increased transaction costs 
associated with vertical separation of the system. 
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5.1.6 Distribution of benefits 
 
The distributional impact of reform, especially between industrial and residential 
customers on the one hand and between consumers and firms on the other, is a relevant 
issue that most studies do not address. A straightforward way to incorporate this 
dimension would be the use of price ratios but quality measures, including some 
indicator(s) of customer service and access to service, could also be used. It is, however, 
noteworthy that the losses of publicly-owned ESIs tend to be financed by the general 
budget. 
 
H.6.0: Reforms in developing countries bring improved access for residential 
consumers, but at higher prices. 
H.6.1: Reforms in developing countries bring prices closer to costs (which may be 
lower) for industrial consumers, as well as better quality and more efficient 
input price signals. 
H.6.2: Reform brings different welfare and distributional effects at different levels 
of income and electrification. 
H.6.3: Inadequate competition and ineffective regulation prevent the benefits being 
passed on to consumers. 
 
Hypotheses H.6.0-1 examine price re-balancing and reduced cross-subsidy, as observed 
in the case of Argentina and, to a lesser extent, in Chile. Hypothesis H.6.2 reflects the 
notion that the general benefits of reform may be lower in countries with high 
electrification rates (e.g. CES countries) but  increased access might offset price rises 
for poor residential consumers. Hypothesis H.6.3 examines the widespread observation 
in the UK, Chile, and Argentina that, at least initially, regulators are slow to pass the 
gains onto customers in the form of lower prices. 
 
 
5.1.7 Asset prices 
 
The effect of reform characteristics and electricity tariffs on the price and proceeds from 
asset sales is another area that could be better investigated. Although maximising 
proceeds is desirable, it can also lead to price increases. 
 
H.7.0: Non-cost-reflective tariff structures have a negative impact on proceeds 
from sales of distribution and generation assets. 
 
This hypothesis addresses the issue of whether a reform that establishes tariffs at 
unsustainable levels (or levels that assume ongoing government subsidies) is likely to 
lead to problems such as expropriation by investors. 
 
 
5.1.8 Vertical and horizontal separation 
 
Competition and privatisation are expected to lead to external and internal efficiency. 
However, unbundling of the system tends to increase transaction costs and loss of 
economies of co-ordination. The net effect is uncertain in the absence of independent 
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regulatory oversight. The effectiveness of competition and incentive regulation will 
determine whether the benefits of reform will exceed the higher transaction costs in 
order to produce net performance improvements. The issue has been researched in the 
context of the UK power sector. 
 
H.8.0: Transaction costs are significant for developing countries and are non-
linear with sector size. Below a certain size, some types of restructuring 
have prohibitive transaction costs. 
H.8.1: There is a threshold size below which wholesale market competition in 
generation is not worthwhile, and power purchase agreements (PPAs) may 
be preferable. 
 
Hypothesis H.8.0 examines the relationship between the system size and the increase in 
transaction costs resulting from restructuring of the sector. It suggests a cut-off point 
below which the increased transaction costs begin to exceed the benefits of unbundling 
of the industry. Hypothesis H.8.1 examines the effect of system size on choice of 
market design. 
 
 
5.1.9 Sector endowment 
 
There is an ongoing debate on the extent to which successful liberalisation depends on 
resource endowment. 
 
H.9.0: A diverse mix of generation mix facilitates introduction of competition in the 
sector. 
H.9.1: The availability of natural gas facilitates introduction of competition in the 
sector. 
H.9.2: Energy and fuel independence are positively correlated with introduction of 
market -oriented reform in developing countries. 
 
Hypothesis H.9.0 reflects the issue of whether limitations on the available technology, 
or the dominance of hydroelectric capacity, limits the scope for free entry in power 
generation. Hypothesis H.9.1 reflects the potential of gas-fired generation which is 
efficient at small scale, has a low capital cost and fast build-time to enable new entrants 
to enter at lower risk than with other fuels. Hypothesis H.9.2 is based on the idea that 
countries (e.g. Chile, UK, Argentina, Norway) which have access to own primary 
energy resources such as hydroelectricity or natural gas seem to have been more likely 
to liberalise their energy sectors. 
 
 
6 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Although electricity sector reform has evolved over a number of years, it has largely 
remained a work in progress. There is a need to learn from the accumulated experience, 
as many developing countries are either contemplating to implement reform, or are at 
some intermediate stage. Our review of cross-country studies has revealed that there is 
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considerable scope for learning from the lessons around the world, but there is a need 
for more up-to-date analysis. 
 
A notable aspect of the existing studies is that the number of countries included in the 
samples used are rather limited, with the notable exception of Bacon and Besant-Jones 
(2001) who includes 115 countries. In general, the samples used only a small number of 
reforming countries. A consequence of this is that much useful information embodied in 
lesser known reforms (or even non-reforming countries) representing counter- factual 
alternatives, is not utilised. 
 
We have also identified a varied, but still representative, set of new hypothesis that can 
be used to test various aspects of reforms. Appendix 3 presents a more detailed list of 
variables required to test the new hypothesis. 
 
A general conclusion of our review is that the existing body of evidence from rigorous 
analysis is rather limited, given the wide range of issues and the many questions that 
arise in connection with the success or failure of reform. In addition, the existing 
evidence that we review points to a number of data and methodological improvements 
that need to be addressed in future studies: 
? no known attempts to use simultaneous equations 
? missing performance indicators 
? missing market structure variables 
? missing endowment variables e.g. threshold effect. 
? missing institutional variables e.g. types of legal systems 
? variables used for reform measure are crude 
? no studies use panel data 
? interaction terms among variables generally missing. 
 
The fact that reform experience in the sector does not go back further than the early 
1990s has meant that most studies have been constrained by observations from a limited 
number of years. At the same time, in the light of the time lag between data availability 
and its analysis, the relevance of most of the existing studies is quickly diminishing. It is 
also important that new analyses are wider in terms of scale and scope, i.e. a larger 
number of jurisdictions and a wider range of issues need to be addressed within a longer 
time frame. 
 
Our review of the analysis of electricity sector reform suggests that there is a great need 
for comprehensive, high quality data. For example, despite the significant resources and 
efforts spent on electricity reform and other infrastructure industries, there is yet no 
coherent set of indicators that are defined and regularly measured to assess, monitor, 
and compare reforms. In a companion paper we have proposed a set of core and other 
useful indicators for electricity reform (see Jamasb, Newbery, Pollitt, 2004). The 
existing state of data sets clear limits for the quantity and quality of empirical research 
useful for policy advice. 
 
The usefulness of the existing evidence from empirical studies for policy advice is 
rather limited. The real world reform issues and debates have tended to move faster than 
the literature can catch up with and analyse them. For example, the private investment 
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in the sector has declined significantly in recent years. There is a considerable need for 
innovative financial and investment solutions. Also, there is an emerging realisation in 
the World Bank and elsewhere about the ability and capacity of some developing 
countries to implement and sustain a workable reform. Many electricity sectors are and 
may remain in a prolonged state of partial reform. For example, the implications of this 
for long-term operation and governance of mixed public-private and semi-competitive 
sectors are unclear. Finally, public perception and acceptance of reform is on the 
decline. However, the existing empirical evidence is of little help in providing guidance 
on how to best tackle these issues. 
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Appendix 1 - The Hypotheses tested in econometric studies 
 
Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
Zhang et al. 
(2002) 
H0: Privatisation leads to 
higher operating efficiency 
and asset utilisation. 
 
-operating efficiency: net 
electricity generation 
(MWh) per employee (#) 
(PI) 
 
-asset utilisation:  electricity 
generation (MWh) / average 
capacity (MW) 
(PI) 
 
-privatisation: existence of 
private generation (dummy) 
(MS/RM) 
 
Result: insignificant 
-GDP per capita (US$ 95) 
(CL) 
Result: significant at the 
1% level 
 
-urban population as % of 
total 
(CL) 
Result: significant at the 
1% level 
 
-industrial output as % of 
GDP 
(CL) 
Result: significance varies 
across models 
 
-degree of economic 
freedom (based on 10-
point indices in ‘Economic 
Freedom of the World: 
2002 Annual Report’) 
(CL) 
Result: significant at the 
1% level 
51 LDCs from 1985-2000. 
Generation and capacity data: 
APERC database and World 
Dev. Indicators. 
 
Labor: Industrial Statistics 
Yearbook, International 
Labour Organisation. 
 
Privatisation, regulation, and 
competition: The Yearbook 
of Privatisation, EIA, WEC, 
and APERC. 
 H1: Privatisation with 
supportive regulation leads 
to higher output and 
capacity. 
 
-output: net generation 
(MWh) per capita  
(PI) 
 
-capacity: generation 
capacity (MW) per capita 
(PI) 
-privatisation: existence of 
private generation (dummy) 
(MS/RM) 
 
-regulation: existence of 
independent regulatory agency 
(dummy)  
(I) 
 
Result: taken together, the 
variables are significant (on 
generation at 10% level, on 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
generation at 10% level, on 
capacity at 5% level) 
 H2: Privatisation leads to 
higher residential and lower 
industrial prices. 
 
-residential prices: user 
price  
(PI) 
 
-industrial price: user price 
(PI) 
 
-privatisation: existence of 
private generation (dummy) 
(MS/RM) 
 
Result: insignificant 
 Price: OLADE , OECD. 
 
 
H3: Competition leads to 
larger capacity, higher 
output, and greater labour 
productivity. 
 
-output: net generation 
(MWh) per capita  
(PI) 
 
-capacity: generation 
capacity (MW) per capita 
(PI) 
 
-labour productivity: net 
electricity generation 
(MWh) per employee (#) 
(PI) 
-competition: existence of 
wholesale market (dummy) 
(RM) 
Result: significant (the levels of 
significance vary across different 
models and equations – either 5 
or 10%)  
  
 
 
H4: Competition leads to 
higher residential and lower 
industrial prices. 
-residential prices: user 
price (US$) 
(PI) 
 
-industrial price: user price 
(PI) 
 
-competition: existence of 
wholesale market (dummy) 
(RM) 
Result: this is significant for 
industrial prices for only one of 
the specified equations (at 1% 
level of significance) 
  
 
 
H5: Independent regulation 
will improve productive 
efficiency. 
 
-output: net generation 
(MWh) per capita  
(PI) 
 
-capacity: generation 
capacity (MW) per capita 
(PI) 
-regulation: existence of 
independent regulatory agency 
(dummy) 
(I) 
Result: insignificant 
  
 
 
H6: Regulation leads to 
higher residential prices. 
-residential prices: user 
price (US$) 
(PI) 
-regulation: existence of 
independent regulatory agency 
(dummy) 
(I) 
Result: insignificant 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
Bacon and 
Besant-Jones 
(2001) 
H0: Country policy and 
institutional indicator are 
positively correlated with 
reform score. 
 
H1: Country risk is 
negatively associated with 
occurrence of reform score. 
 
-reform scores: number of 
reform steps t aken by each 
country in ESMAP (1999): 
corporatisation, 
restructuring, law, 
regulator, IPP entry, 
divestiture 
(RM) 
 
-country policy and institutional 
indicator: based on 20 indicators, 
which focus on macro 
management and sustainability of 
reforms, policies for sustainable 
and equitable growth, policies for 
reducing inequalities, and public 
sector management 
(CL) 
Result: significant (at 5% level of 
significance)  
 
-country risk indicator : based on 
a weighted average of 9 indices,  
of which political risk and 
economic performance each 
account for 25% of the weighting 
(CL) 
Result: significant (at 10% level 
of significance) 
 
-GDP per capita (US$ per capita) 
(CL) 
Result: insignificant 
 
-aid/GDP ratio  
(CL) 
Result: insignificant 
 
-commercial energy use per 
capita (MWh per capita) 
(SE) 
 
-annual growth rate of 
commercial energy use per capita 
(SE) 
 
-regional dummies for 
Latin America, Africa, 
Asia, etc. 
(CL) 
Result: very significant 
Cross-section data on the 115 
developing countries 
surveyed in ESMAP (1999). 
The dependent variable is 
from the study. The source of 
other data (policy, risk, and 
energy use data) is not 
specified. 
 
 
 
 
 
Drillisch and 
Riechmann 
(1998) 
H0: There is a correlation 
between energy dependency 
and choice of liberalisation 
model. 
-liberalisation index,  
(RM) 
composed by the following 
elements: 
-prices (US$),  
(PI) 
Result: insignificant 
 
-“UK/ commonwealth” 
dummy 
(CL) 
Result: insignificant 
Data on countries: Australia, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Japan, 
Norway, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Finland, 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
 
H1: There is a correlation 
between environmental 
commitment and 
liberalisation 
 
wholesale reform 
-reform model (pool, 
wholesale wheeling, 
competitive bidding) 
-timing (reform in 1990, 0.5 
points deducted for each 
year of delay) 
retail reform 
-reform model (regulated 
TPA, negotiated TPA) 
-timing (reform in 1990, 0.5 
points deducted for each 
year of delay) 
 
-energy independence index 
(computed from total primary 
energy supply of each different 
fuel, total exports of each fuel, 
indigenous production of each 
fuel, share of each fuel in total 
electricity production) 
(SE) 
Result: for the restricted model 
the coefficient is significant at 
the 1% level 
 
-environmental index 
(constructed from information on 
Kyoto target increase, renewable 
energy R&D expenditure/ GNP, 
implementation of energy/ 
carbon tax, energy related 
carbon-dioxide emissions, 
renewable energy capacity 
excluding hydro, renewable 
energy capacity including hydro) 
(SE) 
Result: insignificant 
Zealand, Sweden, Finland, 
UK, USA.  
 
Domestic primary fuel 
production and domestic 
primary fuel used, hard coal 
production, fuel imports and 
exports, fuel shares in total 
electricity production 
(required for all the countries 
in the sample for 1995 – for 
the calculation of the energy 
independence indices);  
prices discriminated by types 
of customer; qualitative data 
on the timing and model of 
the reform (both at wholesale 
and retail levels, required to 
construct the liberalisation 
index); qualitative and 
quantitative data on national 
commitment to protect the 
environment (such as Kyoto 
protocol targets, renewable 
energy R&D expenditure/ 
GNP, etc.). 
 
Data: mostly IEA for 
quantitative data, but various 
sources for qualitative data. 
Periods: 01 - mostly works 
with 1995 data.  
Number of observations: 13 
countries. 
 
Ruffin (2003) H0: Judicial independence, 
economic ideology, and 
distributional conflict 
influences competition. 
 
 
- competition  score 
(composite variable) (RM) 
 
 
 
 
-judicial independence 
(composite indicators/indices) 
(CL). 
Results: mostly positively, but not 
significantly correlated with 
competition. 
-real per capita income 
(CL) 
 
-average percentage of 
foreign investment in 
country total investment 
(CL) 
Up to 75 countries for 
different model 
specifications. Data: mostly 
for 1990s from a diverse set 
of sources. 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1: Judicial independence, 
economic ideology, and 
distributional conflict 
influences private 
ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2: Judicial independence, 
economic ideology, and 
distributional conflict 
influences the extent of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ownership score 
(composite variable) (RM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- overall reform score 
(composite variable) (RM) 
 
 
-economic ideology (composite 
indicators/indices) (CL). 
Results: economic orthodoxy 
mostly positively, and significant, 
correlated with the degree of 
competition. 
 
-distributional conflict 
(composite indicators/indices) 
(CL). 
Results: level of conflict 
negatively, and mostly 
significant, correlated with 
degree of competition. 
 
 
-judicial independence 
(composite indicators/indices). 
Result: mostly not significant 
with changing signs. 
 
-economic ideology (composite 
indicators/indices). 
Results: economic orthodoxy is 
mostly positively, and significant, 
correlated with private 
ownership. 
 
-distributional conflict 
(composite indicators/indices). 
Results: higher level of conflict 
mostly positively, and 
insignificant, correlated with 
private ownership. 
 
 
 
- judicial independence 
(composite indicators/indices) 
Result: mostly positively, thought 
not always significant, correlated 
(CL) 
 
-political regime (CL) 
 
-political instability (CL) 
 
Results: Generally, control 
variables are insignificant 
and/or exhibit changing 
signs. 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
influences the extent of 
reform. 
 
 
 not always significant, correlated 
with extent of reform. 
 
- economic ideology (composite 
indicators/indices) 
Result: economic orthodoxy 
positively, and mostly significant, 
correlated with reform. 
 
-distributional conflict 
(composite indicators/indices) 
Results: mostly negatively, 
though not always significant, 
correlated with reform score. 
 
Bergara, 
Henisz and 
Spiller (1997) 
H0: Well-defined and 
credible political institutions 
are positively correlated 
with investment in the 
electricity sector. 
 
-log of public & private 
generation capacity per 
1000 population 
(PI) 
-political index (CL) based on 
the following elements: 
 
-judicial independence with  
 index of law & order, 
-formal constraints on executive 
discretion 
(federalist state dummy, 
dual executive/legislature 
dummy, bicameral legislatures 
dummy, index of legislators’ 
effectiveness, 
index of military role in 
government,  index of gov. 
particip. by org. religion,  
degree of developm. of pol. 
parties), 
-informal constraints on 
executive discretion 
 (index of quality of bureaucracy,  
index of corruption in gov., index 
of racial/nationalist tensions). 
 
-political index (2) - as above but 
index of law & order replaced 
with the ‘tenure of high/supreme 
court justices’ in the index; 
-GDP per capita (log) 
(CL) 
 
-industry share in GDP 
(log) 
(CL) 
 
-urbanisation % (log) 
(CL) 
 
-energy share of hydro 
(log) 
(SE) 
 
The analysis uses data from a 
total of 91 developed and 
developing countries for 
1987. The size of the actual 
samples used in different 
models are 38 and 87 or 86 
countries depending on data 
availability for variables. 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
court justices’ in the index; 
tenure of justices as separate 
variable. 
 
-alternative political variables: 
  
-sum of ‘law & order’, 
‘bureaucracy’ and ‘corruption’ 
variables plus ‘index of 
likelihood of contract 
modification w. foreign business’ 
and ‘index of likelihood of 
confiscation nationalisation’, 
-index of inst. constraints on 
chief executive decision by 
accountability groups,  
-index of institutionalised 
democracy,  
-gastil index of political and civil 
liberties. 
 
Result: significant 
 
Holborn 
(2001) 
H0: The probability that an 
individual IPP will enter a 
country with monopsony 
market is increasing in the 
amount of the firm’s prior 
monopsony market 
experience. 
 
H1: The probability that an 
individual IPP will enter a 
country with a competitive 
generation market is 
increasing in the amount of 
the firm’s competitive 
market experience.  
 
H2: The probability that an 
IPP will enter a country is 
decreasing in the risk of 
-the firm’s decision to enter 
a country in a given year – 
takes the value of 1 if 
expected profits net of cost 
of capital are non-negative; 
otherwise takes the value of  
0 
(PI) 
 
-country-level  variables: GDP 
growth (CL)  
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level 
GDP (US$) (CL) 
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level 
 a dummy variable to indicate if a 
country has implemented a 
competitive or a monopsony 
market (RM) 
Results vary according to model 
a measure of political risk 
(higher for stronger political 
constraints) (CL) 
Result: significant (either at 5 or 
at 0.1%, depending on the 
model) 
-first year firms were able 
to enter a country (where 
hard to observe when 
liberalisation started, 
assumes this year to be the 
year of the first IPP entry) 
(RM)  
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
decreasing in the risk of 
direct and indirect political 
expropriation. 
 
H3: The effect of the risk of 
direct or indirect political 
expropriation on the 
probability of entry is lower 
for competitive generation 
markets than for monopsony 
generation markets. 
 
H4: The probability that an 
individual IPP will enter a 
country with a relatively 
high level of political risk is 
increasing in the amount of 
prior generation experience. 
 
H5: The effect of prior 
experience on the 
probability of entering 
higher political risk 
countries is greater for 
experience gained in 
monopsony than in 
competitive markets. 
a variable which is the product of 
the dummy of competitive 
market by the measure of 
political risk (RMxCL) 
a dummy variable to indicate 
privatisation programmes (RM) 
Result: either significant at 0.1% 
or insignificant, depending on 
the model  
-relationship variables: 
geographic distance between the 
firm’s home country and the 
potential host country (CL), 
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level  
dummy variables to indicate 
whether the two countries share a 
common language or a colonial 
history (CL) 
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level  
 
-firm-level variables: value of a 
firm’s net assets in each year (PI) 
Result: significant at the 5% 
level 
a variable to indicate the joint 
effect of firm size and political 
risk on the probability of entry 
(the product of the value of 
assets by the measure of political 
risk) (PIxCL) 
Result: insignificant 
cumulative number of projects in 
competitive markets (PI)  
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level when combined with 
competitive dummy 
cumulative number of projects in 
monopsony markets (PI) 
Result: significant at the 0.1% 
level either alone or combined 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
level either alone or combined 
with competitive dummy 
The variables are used to create a 
number of individual and 
interaction terms. 
 
 
 
 
Zelner and 
Henisz (2000) 
H0: the effect of political 
constraints on investment: 
 
-when facing strong interest 
group competition, a utility 
will invest more (less) in the 
presence of higher (lower) 
political constraints, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
-as the level of interest 
group competition declines, 
the positive (negative) effect 
of political constraints on 
investment becomes smaller 
and may become negative 
(positive), ceteris paribus. 
 
H1: the effect of interest 
group competition on 
investment: 
 
-when operating in an 
environment with relatively 
low political constraints, a 
utility will invest more (less) 
in the presence of weak 
(strong) interest group 
competition, ceteris paribus. 
 
-as political constraints 
increase, the positive 
(negative) effect of weak 
-each country’s annual 
growth rate of megawatts of 
generation capacity per 
capita (this is the measure 
of investment used) 
(PI) 
 
-political constraints variable 
(CL) – constructed from 
information on the number of 
independent branches of 
government, adjusted to take into 
account the extent of alignment 
across different branches and of 
preference heterogeneity within 
each legislative branch 
Result: mostly significant at the 
5% level 
 
-interest group competition 
variable – simply the ratio of 
industrial to total electricity 
consumption (SE) 
Result: mostly significant at the 
5% level 
 
-existing penetration level 
variable – megawatts of 
generation capacity per capita in 
the previous period (PI) 
Result: mostly significant at the 
10% level 
 
-government’s capital 
investment budget (CL) – 
measured as real annual gross US 
dollar public investment on 
capital spending per capita; 
Result: insignificant 
n.a. Country -level panel data of 
78 developed and developing 
countries over the period 
1970-1994. The countries of 
the sample are grouped in 
three categories: countries 
facing high political 
constraints, countries facing 
low political constraints and 
weak interest group 
competition, and countries 
facing low political 
constraints and strong interest 
group competition. 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
(negative) effect of weak 
(strong) interest group 
competition on investment 
becomes smaller, ceteris 
paribus. 
-the effect of increasing 
interest group competition 
on investment is non-
positive. 
 
 
-demand growth (CL) – GDP 
per capita real growth 
 
The coefficients of the interaction 
terms are also significant. The 
results are consistent with the 
hypotheses 
Siniscalco, 
Bortolotti 
and Fantini 
(2001) 
H0: vertical integration has 
a negative impact on the 
number of privatisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
-total number of  sales in 
electricity generation in a 
given country (PI) 
 
-a dummy for vertical integration 
(MS) 
Results: significant at the 5% 
level for both number of 
privatisations and proceeds from 
privatisation 
-average annual electricity 
consumption (kWh) (SE) 
Result: insignificant 
a dummy for the political 
orientation of a county’s 
privatisation (CL) 
Result: significant and 
positive at the 10% level 
for number of 
privatisations 
an institutional credibility 
index (CL)  
Result: significant at the 
5% level for the percentage 
of privatised stock 
and financial market 
liquidity indicators (CL) 
Result: significant at the 
10% level for privatisation 
proceeds  
Privatisation data on 48 
power generation companies 
from 19 developed and 
developing countries for the 
1977-1997 period. Source: 
Privatisation International 
(1997) and original 
documents for some countries 
not included in this source. 
 H1: vertical integration has 
a negative impact on 
aggregate proceeds of 
privatisation.  
 
-the per country aggregate 
proceeds from total sales 
(PI) (US$ 96) 
   
 H2: a more regulated 
environment is conducive to 
privatisation; therefore, 
regulation has a positive 
impact on the number of 
privatisations. 
-total number of  sales in 
electricity generation in a 
given country (PI) 
-a regulatory index (which takes 
the maximum value when a 
country’s regulatory setting 
entails: regulated TPA, a 
regulated wholesale market and 
an independent regulatory 
agency) (RM, I) 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
 agency) (RM, I) 
Results: significant at the 5% 
level for both number of 
privatisations and proceeds from 
privatisation. Significant at the 
10% level for the percentage of 
privatised stock. 
 H3: regulation has a 
positive impact on 
aggregate proceeds of 
privatisation. 
 
-the per country aggregate 
proceeds from total sales 
(US$ 96) (PI) 
   
 H4: regulation has a 
positive impact on the 
percentage of privatised 
stock. 
 
-the stake privatised at firm 
level (PI) 
 
   
Steiner (2001) H0: Regulation and 
restructuring leads to 
improved utilisation rate 
and reserve margin in 
electricity generation. 
 
H1: Regulation and 
restructuring leads to lower 
industrial electricity prices 
and industrial/residential 
price ratio. 
 
-industrial end-user price in 
PPPs (PI) 
 
-ratio of industrial to 
residential prices in PPPs 
(PI) 
 
-utilisation rate: energy 
production/total average 
capacity (PI) 
 
-distance of actual from 
optimal reserve margin  
(PI) 
 
-time to liberalisation  (years) 
(RM) 
Results: significantly positive for 
prices 
 
-time to privatisation (years) 
(RM) 
Results: insignificant for prices 
 
-unbundling of generation from 
transmission (multi-level 
indicator) (RM) 
Results: insignificant for prices, 
significantly positive for 
utilisation rate. 
 
-private ownership (multi-level 
indicator) (RM) 
Results: significantly positive for 
prices and for utilisation rate. 
 
-third party access (dummy) 
(RM)  
Results: insignificant for prices 
and for efficiency measures 
 -GDP (US$) (CL) 
Result: insignificant 
 
-hydro share in generation 
(SE) 
Result: significant for 
prices 
 
-nuclear share in 
generation (SE) 
 
-state preference against 
nuclear technology (SE) 
 
-state preference in favour 
of coal technology (SE) 
 
-urbanisation (CL) 
 
Panel data from International 
Energy Agency and other 
sources covering 19 OECD 
countries. Number of periods 
(1986-1996): 11 Þ number 
of observations: 209 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables Notes: # of countries, times 
period, data source 
and for efficiency measures 
 
-wholesale pool (dummy) (RM) 
Results: significantly negative for 
prices 
 
-choice threshold (RM) 
 
-T price regulation (not used) 
(RM) 
 
Hattori and 
Tsutsui 
(2003) 
H0: Unbundling of 
generation from 
transmission, third party 
access, the existence of a 
wholesale market, and 
privatisation leads to lower 
industrial electricity prices 
and industrial/residential 
price ratios. As the start of 
liberalisation and 
privatisation approaches 
prices decrease.  
-industrial end-user price in 
PPPs (PI) 
 
-ratio of industrial to 
residential prices in PPPs 
(PI) 
 
 
 
-wholesale pool (dummy) (RM) 
Results: significantly positive for 
prices 
 
-third party access (dummy) 
(RM)  
Results: significantly negative for 
prices  
 
-private ownership (multi-level 
indicator) (RM) 
Results: significantly negative for 
prices  
 
-time to privatisation  (years) 
(RM) 
Results: statistically insignificant 
 
-GDP (US$ PPP) (CL) 
Results: statistically 
significantly negative for 
prices 
 
-share of hydro capacity 
(SE) 
Results: statistically 
insignificant 
 
-share of nuclear capacity 
(SE) 
Results: statistically 
insignificant 
 
 
Panel dataset of 19 OECD 
countries for the period 1987-
1999 (number of 
observations: 232). 
Wolak (1997) H0: Market structure and 
market rules influence price 
average and price volatility. 
-half-hourly or hourly spot 
prices (PI) 
-lagged half-hourly or hourly 
spot prices (PI) 
Results: the cross-country 
analysis suggests that market 
rules and market structure exert 
strong influence on the 
behaviour of prices. 
 Hourly or half-hourly spot 
prices of electricity in the 
England & Wales Pool, Nord 
Pool, Victoria Power 
Exchange, New Zealand 
North Island, New Zealand 
South Island, from 1990 until 
1997. 
 
Notes: RM – reform measures  I – (sector-level) institutions  PI – performance indicator  MS – market structure  SE – sector endowments CL – country-level variables 
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Appendix 2 - New hypotheses proposed 
 
Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables 
Investment 
Hypotheses 
H.1.0: Economic growth and electricity 
demand growth lead to higher private 
investment. 
 
H.1.1: Lower levels of IFI investment 
are associated with lower levels of 
private and domestic investment in 
many, but not all developing countries. 
 
H.1.2: Foreign private investment is a 
function of effective tariff reform (the 
extent to which extra investment is self-
financing). 
 
-private investment in  G,T,D 
 
 
 
-private investment in G,T, D. 
 
 
 
 
-private investment in G,T, D. 
-GDP growth rate, unit sales (annual) 
 
 
 
-IFI investment in G,TD. 
 
 
 
 
-ratio of residential to industrial prices, 
ratio of electricity price to price of 
marginal fuel. 
 
Network 
regulation 
H.2.1: Regulatory independence and 
credible arrangements have a positive 
effect on performance in terms of 
investments, and cost reflective prices 
 
H.2.2: Price/Revenue cap regulation is 
superior to cost of service regulation 
for T+D networks in terms of cost 
efficiency and loss minimisation. 
 
H.2.3: The introduction of price or 
revenue caps is a function of the degree 
of independence of the regulator. 
 
H.2.4: The presence of incentive 
regulation increases  investment 
(ceteris paribus). 
 
H.2.5: Privatisation of distribution 
networks improves efficiency when 
combined with incentive regulation. 
 
 
-investment levels 
-indust./resid. price ratios 
-reduce cross subsidy 
 
 
-no. of  cust/units distributed per 
employee, no.of cust/units 
distributed p er unit of capital (D), km 
of transmission wire per employee. 
 
-dummy for Price cap/cost of service 
regulation. 
 
 
-private investment. 
 
 
 
-operating efficiency and capital 
utilisation measures 
-degree of regulatory independence 
 
 
 
 
-dummy for price cap/cost of service 
regulation. 
 
 
 
-regulatory independence variable: 
autonomous, government, semi-
autonomous. 
 
-dummy for price cap/PBR regulation. 
 
 
 
-interaction variable e.g. price-
cap/privatisation 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables 
System losses & 
quality of 
service 
H.3.0: Privatisation is associated with 
lower bill arrears and less technical and 
non-technical losses 
 
H.3.1: Reforms which provide financial 
incentives for loss reduction and also 
legal enforcement of bill payment 
reduce measured losses. 
 
H.3.2: Privatisation is associated with 
increased numbers of meters and 
increased pre-payment charging. 
 
H.3.3: Increased numbers of meters/pre-
payment is associated with lower levels 
of arrears and non-technical losses. 
 
H.3.4: Incentive regulation without 
clear incentives for network companies 
to supply quality will reduce quality. 
 
-non technical losses, arrears  
 
 
 
-losses 
 
 
 
 
-no. of prepayment meters, total 
numbers of meters. 
 
 
-non-payment variable 
 
 
 
-losses 
-number and duration of power 
outages 
 
-privatisation dummy 
 
 
 
-dummy for presence of loss reduction 
incentive payment, incentive regulation, 
strength of judiciary index. 
 
 
-privatisation Dummy  
 
 
 
-no. of prepayment meters, total 
numbers of meters. 
 
 
-type of regulation, explicit incentives 
for quality, e.g. customer penalties 
 
 
Market 
structure 
H.4.0: HHI of less than 2500 is required 
for effective competition in the 
generation market. 
 
H.4.1: Joint ownership of generation 
and transmission/distribution reduces 
efficiency and increases prices and may 
deter entry. 
 
H.4.2: Cost based bidding mitigates 
market power and price fluctuations in 
generation markets. 
 
-price/marginal fuel cost 
 
 
 
-price of electricity 
 
 
 
 
-price, of generated power/marginal 
fuel cost, max-min range of price of 
generated power/marginal fuel cost 
 
-HHI in generation 
 
 
 
-vertical integration dummies 
 
 
 
 
-dummy for cost based bidding 
 
 
 
Threshold 
Effects 
H.5.0: There is a threshold size (which 
may depend on endowments) below 
which vertical separation (or 
competition) is technically difficult or 
not worthwhile due to the transaction 
costs involved. 
 
-price/marginal fuel cost 
 
 
 
-degree of vertical separation 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables 
Distribution of 
benefits 
H.6.0: Reforms in developing 
countries bring higher prices for 
residential consumers, but improved 
access. 
 
H.6.1: Reforms in developing countries 
bring lower prices for industrial 
consumers but better quality and more  
Efficient input price signals. 
 
H.6.2: Reforms bring different overall 
benefits at different levels of income and 
electrification. 
 
H.6.3: Ineffective reform design 
(competition / regulation) prevents the 
benefits to be passed to consumers. 
 
-ratio residential/non residential 
price, outages, electricity rate. 
 
 
 
-ratio, industrial/non-industrial price, 
outages, price/marginal fuel cost. 
 
 
 
-change in price – industrial, 
residential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-reform variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-income per capita, electrification rate 
 
Asset prices H.7.0: Non-cost- reflective tariff 
structures have a negative impact on 
proceeds from sales of distribution and 
generation assets. 
 
-asset sales revenue 
 
 
 
 
-ratio of electricity price to marginal 
generation cost. 
 
 
 
 
Vertical and 
horizontal 
separation 
H.8.0: Transaction costs are significant 
for developing countries and are non-
linear in size. Below a certain sector 
size certain types of reform have 
prohibitive transaction costs. 
 
H.8.1: There is a threshold size below 
which wholesale market competition in 
generation is not worthwhile and power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) may be 
preferable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-costs of power pool, SBM, power 
exchange 
-size of the sector. 
-type of reform enacted. 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Independent 
Variable(s) 
Control Variables 
Sector 
endowment 
H.9.0: A diverse mix of generation mix 
facilitates introduction of competition 
in the sector. 
 
H.9.1: The availability of natural gas 
facilitates introduction of competition 
in the sector. 
 
H.9.2: Energy and fuel independence 
are positively correlated with 
introduction of market-oriented reforms 
in developing countries. 
 
 
-competition index 
 
 
 
-competition index 
 
 
 
-reform score/index 
-number of technologies in the 
generation mix with share higher than 
10%. 
 
-natural gas production and proven 
reserves in relation to the size of the 
electricity sector. 
 
-share of domestic energy and fuel of 
total used. 
-income per capita 
 
- political and institutional 
indices 
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Appendix 3 – Extended list of variables for future studies and hypothesis 
 
 Economy level Sector level 
 
Generation Distribution Transmission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 
Performance 
Indicators  
 
-total private 
investments (US$) 
(foreign, domestic) 
-total public 
investments (US$) 
-IFI investments in 
total and in power 
sector 
-private investments 
(US$) (foreign, 
domestic) 
-public investments 
(US$) 
 
-wholesale price (US$/ 
MWh) 
-residential price (US$/ 
MWh) 
-industrial price (US$/ 
MWh) 
-residential / industrial 
price ratio 
-marginal fuel cost (oil, 
gas, coal as appropriate) 
 
-sector profitability 
-arrears of revenue 
 
-public and private (domestic, 
foreign) investments (US$): 
· greenfield 
· privatisation 
 
-capacity utilisation 
-labour productivity 
-plant availability factor 
-profitability 
-arrears of revenue 
-public and private (domestic, foreign) 
investments (US$): 
· privatisation  
· network improvement  expansion 
 
-profitability 
-arrears of revenue 
 
-network losses 
(technical and non-technical) (%) 
-electrification (%) 
 
-quality of service (no. of interruptions and  
no. of minutes lost per 100 customers) 
-private investments 
(US$) (foreign, 
domestic) 
-total public 
investments (US$) 
-profitability (if 
separated) 
-arrears of revenue (if 
relevant). 
 
 
2. 
Reform 
measures – 
unbundling, 
markets, 
concentration, 
& competition 
 
 -inter-connections 
(capacity, share of tot. 
market) 
 
-% share of vertically 
integrated supplied 
electricity 
 
 
 
-retail competition 
-% share of eligible 
customers 
-% share of 1st,2nd, 3rd  
suppliers 
-suppliers w. share >x% 
 
-vertical separation (accounting, 
legal, ownership) 
-pool 
-organised contract market 
-SBM 
-share of volumes traded in spot 
& contract markets 
-type of bidding in power market 
(cost, price?) 
 
-share of x largest generation 
firms 
-no. of generators w. market 
share larger than z%. 
-HHI 
-annual max and min prices in 
power pool 
-vertical separation (accounting, legal, 
ownership) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- degree of market opening 
 
- % of customer class switched from 
incumbent 
- vertical separation 
form G and D 
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 Economy level Sector level 
 
Generation Distribution Transmission 
2. 
Reform 
measures - 
Privatisation 
 
 
 -date of privatisation 
-asset sales revenue split 
by function 
 
 
 
-share of private (domestic, 
foreign), local, government in G 
(MW, MWh) 
-no. of private, local, government 
firms 
-share of private, local, government in 
delivered energy (MWh) 
-no. of private, local, government firms 
 
-network ownership 
(private, public, local) 
 
-TSO (public, private, 
…) 
 
 
3. 
 
Reform 
measures - 
Regulation and  
Policy 
 
 
 
 -see Item (B)8 
 
*See also survey for the 
WB: 
-who sets tariffs 
-% share of taxes in 
prices 
-date of law, regulation 
and effective dates 
-network access (rTPA, nTPA) 
 
-entry with authorisation or free 
  
 
 
-PCAP, ROR  
 
4. 
Market 
structure 
 
 -system size 
- ownership structure 
-resource mix   
 
 
 
5. 
Institutions, 
Endowments 
 and control  
variables 
 
-Item (A)9 
 
-GDP (US$) 
-GDP per capita (US$ 
per capita) 
 
-GDP growth rate (%) 
-country credit rating 
 
-debt payment /export 
ratio 
-domestic interest rate 
-inflation rate 
 
-demand growth rate (% 
p.a.) 
 
-total profits after tax 
(US$) 
-total assets (US$) 
-no of employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-generation assets (US$) 
 
-generation resource mix 
-no of employees 
-cost of pool or SBM or power 
exchange. 
-distribution assets (US$) 
 
-distribution network length (overhead, 
underground) (km) 
 
-no. of customers (residential, non-
residential, industrial, total) 
-energy delivered (MWh) (residential, 
non-residential, industrial, total) 
 
-transformers  (capacity (MVA), number) 
-meters  (number) 
(of which residential and pre-payment?) 
-maximum demand (MW) 
-no of employees 
-transmission assets 
(US$) 
 
-no of employees 
 
-km of transmission 
wires (split by voltage 
level if possible) 
                                                 
8 The information requirements for the construction of an Item (B) indicator are specified after the table. 
9 The information requirements for the construction of an Item (A) indicator are specified after the table. 
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(A) - Qualitative information required to construct institutional indicators: 
 
· system of government (Parliamentary/ Presidential system) 
· number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chamber, judiciary. etc.) with veto power 
over policy change 
· party composition of each branch (in order to assess alignment) 
· information on electoral rules: 
o non-simultaneous elections of different branches of government 
o proportional or district representation 
· effective number of parties 
· tenure of elected officials 
· corruption indices 
· reliability of judiciary 
· type of judicial system 
· other variables on general institutional environment 
 
(B) – Qualitative information required to construct a regulatory indicators: 
 
· independence of regulator (independent/government dept/semi-autonomous) 
· price regulation/cost of service 
· quality regulation (y/n) 
· existence of financial guarantees for foreign investment 
· responsibilities of regulator 
· date of creation of regulator 
· multi-sector regulator? If yes, which are the other sectors? 
· financing of regulator 
· total number of employees (discriminated in number of technicians, engineers, accountants, economists, lawyers, other) 
· who appoints head/ commission, parliamentary approval for appointment 
· Fixed-term appointment 
· length of term (in years) 
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· re-appointment 
· authority to fire commission, and reasons for firing 
· how many heads have been removed so far 
· who can veto regulator’s decisions 
· who issues policy guidelines for regulator 
· publicly available policy guidelines? 
· verbal instructions by minister/ president? 
· decentralisation: have regional regulator been created? 
· regulator compels financial/ performance information? 
· standardised reporting format? 
· how and by whom performance is audited? 
· consultation process prior to decisions of regulator, type of consultation process 
· who participates in regulatory proceedings? 
· do utilities have the right to appeal regulatory decisions? 
· where can utilities appeal to at 1st, 2nd and 3rd instance 
· can other parties appeal? 
· what other parties can appeal? 
· are meetings actually open to public? 
· are meetings required by law to be open? 
· are regulator’s decisions publicly available? 
· are regulator’s decisions required to be published? 
· where decisions are published 
· regulator’s decisions actually published? 
· where explanations of decisions are required to be published 
· where explanations of decisions are actually published 
· what does the legislation require from the regulator with respect to dealing with consumer’s complaints? 
· how does the regulator actually deals with consumer’s complaints? 
· number of consumers’ complaints received p.a. 
· is there any assessment of consumer’s satisfaction with the way the regulator deals with complaints? 
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